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International Human Rights Adjudication, Subsidiarity,
and Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict
Clara Sandoval*
I. INTRODUCTION
In their chapters, Shuichi Furuya and Cristián Correa have provided strong
evidence to support the claim that there is a right to reparation for victims of
armed conflict.1 Both have also emphasised the extent to which the right to
reparation is recognised, particularly under international human rights law
and not only in relation to victims of armed conflict. Indeed, it is under this
branch of public international law that States have explicitly recognised this
right in various treaties such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on
Enforced Disappearance2 or the UN Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman andDegrading Treatment.3 Importantly, both chapters move
away from a discussion about the existence of a substantive right to reparation
of victims of armed conflict towards a discussion about its operationalisation.4
* The author is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for its support to the
Human Rights Law Implementation Project, of which she is a co-investigator, and to the Arts
and Humanities Research Council for its support to the Reparations, Responsibility and
Victimhood in Transitional Societies, of which she is also a co-investigator. Various parts of
this chapter have been written with the findings of these projects inmind. She is also grateful to
the members of both teams who provided her with great input and criticism at different stages
of writing, and to colleagues at the School of Law at the University of Essex.
1 See Furuya, ‘Right to Reparation’, Chapter 1 in this volume, sections III and V.A; Correa,
‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’, Chapter 2 in this volume, sections II.A and B.
2 Art. 24(4) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, 20 December 2006, 2716 UNTS 3.
3 Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS, 85.
4 Shuichi Furuya states that ‘an abstract discussion of the substantive right to reparation has little
significance; the concrete substance of that right can and must be identified in the respective
historical circumstances in which policy-makers found it necessary to set out a procedure’:
Furuya, ‘Right to Reparation’, Chapter 1 in this volume, section I. Cristián Correa also states
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This chapter takes the same operationalisation approach. It argues that,
under international human rights law, significant practice has accumulated
on the right to reparation for victims of armed conflict as a result of the work of
international human rights mechanisms and domestic courts adjudicating on
this right, as well as States undergoing transitional justice processes and setting
up domestic reparation programmes. This contrasts with the almost non-
existent practice of international or domestic courts adjudicating on repar-
ation as a direct result of violations of humanitarian law and the scarce,
although growing, practice on the right to reparation for victims of armed
conflict under international criminal law.
This practice needs to be distilled if we are to fully understand the chal-
lenges it raises and the complexities that go unnoticed when reparation for
victims of armed conflict is at stake. Indeed, looking at actual practice can
shed light on the substantive right to reparation for victims of armed conflict.
Current practice on the right to reparation for victims of armed conflict
under human rights law occurs at the domestic and the international levels.
Under international human rights law, States have the obligation to respect
and ensure rights. This general rule ‘to ensure rights’ has been understood to
include reparation for the harm caused as a result of human rights violations.5
When gross and systematic human rights violations, such as displacement,
disappearance, or torture, happen as a result of armed conflict, States can
discharge their obligation to provide reparation by means of at least two
remedies. First, domestic courts adjudicate on the human rights violations
that took place and order reparation against the State and/or against the
perpetrator of the violation(s). Second, States undergoing a process of transi-
tional justice can establish domestic reparation programmes to redress thou-
sands or millions of victims by means of a more uniform, faster, cheaper, and
simpler administrative process than that involved before a tribunal.6 Such
administrative programmes have been established around the world, as
that ‘[t]here is little effect on recognising the existence of a right if themechanisms available for
the right bearer are non-existent, inaccessible, or compromised by a lack of independence from
the respective government’: Correa, ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’, Chapter 2 in this
volume, section III.
5 See, e.g., Art. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 407, together with General Comment 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13, 26 May 2004, or Art. 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),
22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, and IACtHR, Velásquez Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Merits,
29 July 1998, para. 166.
6 OHCHR, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States, Reparations Programmes, 2008, 9–10,
available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ReparationsProgrammes.pdf.
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illustrated by domestic reparation programmes in Sierra Leone, Germany,
Morocco, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia.7
Human rights law places the duty on States to respond to human rights
violations. However, victims can seek justice and reparation internationally
when States fail to provide adequate and effective domestic remedies to
address the violations suffered, provided that the States allegedly responsible
have recognised the jurisdiction of international bodies to adjudicate on such
violations, including reparation.
There are many international and regional bodies that can decide on
human rights violations that occur in times of armed conflict, both judicial
and quasi-judicial. They include UN treaty-monitoring bodies, such as the
Human Rights Committee or the Committee against Torture, and regional
mechanisms, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the
Inter-American System on Human Rights (including the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, or IACtHR), and the African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and/or
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights).
This chapter focuses on the interplay that takes place between international
human rights mechanisms set up to adjudicate on disputes concerning human
rights violations, including those that occur during armed conflict, and which
have jurisdiction to order reparation and domestic reparation programmes.
This interplay between the domestic and the international is of utmost import-
ance given that it is here where the scope and reach of the substantive right to
reparation of victims of armed conflict is at stake and can be defined.
Unfortunately, despite its importance, reflections on this interplay are cur-
rently missing in the literature. This chapter aims to fill this gap: it is an
original and timely contribution to a very important debate that continues to
be unnoticed.
The interplay between the international and the domestic is regulated by
the principle of subsidiarity. This principle underpins international law’s
architecture and manifests itself in different ways in adjudication. It means
that international bodies do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on a case
unless the State that allegedly violated human rights has failed to address
such violations.8
7 Cristián Correa analyses administrative processes in ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’,
Chapter 2 in this volume, section II.B.
8 Samantha Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law: What Is Subsidiary about
Human Rights’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 61 (2016), 69–107 (79).
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The principle of subsidiarity is key for a harmonious coexistence between
domestic and international remedies. At least in theory, it would be expected
that if a case were to reach an international human rights body because a State
had failed to provide victims of armed conflict with adequate and effective
remedies, the international body would assume full jurisdiction over the case,
including over reparation. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows, this is far from
the situation. Even if a case reaches international human rights bodies, such
bodiesmight still be willing to exercise some deference to the State in question
and, as a consequence, it is for the State to define, in practice, the scope and
reach of the right to reparation for victims of armed conflict.
To reflect on the interplay of subsidiarity and coexistence among inter-
national and domestic remedies in relation to reparation for victims of armed
conflict, this chapter begins with a consideration of subsidiarity under inter-
national human rights law. This is followed by two sections dedicated to
a careful analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American bodies on repar-
ation for victims of armed conflict, particularly the IACtHR, and then of the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, where the interplay between domestic responses
via domestic reparation programmes and these international mechanisms is
palpable. The sections on the jurisprudence of these courts is then comple-
mented by some reflections as to what these courts should do when dealing
with reparation and subsidiarity. The chapter concludes with some legal
observations on how these courts should address this interplay, and the type
of legal analysis that is needed to help to define the scope and reach of the right
to reparation of victims of armed conflict, but in a way that is faithful to what is
at the heart of the right to reparation: by putting victims at the centre of the
legal discussion and wiping out, as far as possible, the harm they have suffered.
II. SUBSIDIARITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
As Nicholas Barber and Richard Ekins state, this principle ‘is at its heart
a moral principle about how state and society . . . should be structured’.9
Furthermore, as Paolo Carozza explains, ‘each social and political group
should help smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends
without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself’.10 This key moral and polit-
ical principle is not alien to public international law. Indeed, this principle has
9 Nicholas W. Barber and Richard Ekins, ‘Situating Subsidiarity’, American Journal of
Jurisprudence 61 (2016), 5–12 (5).
10 Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’,
American Journal of International Law 97 (2003), 38–79 (38).
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helped to shape international governance, by distinguishing, for example,
between the sovereign power of States and that given to international organ-
isations or bodies created by them, as well as the way in which such power
should interact. From this perspective, the international system is built on the
idea that States, the main subjects of international law, and within them their
communities should be allowed to govern themselves; only if they are unable
to do so will others be allowed to scrutinise their conduct and help them to
fulfil their international obligations.
This principle has also shaped international human rights law, making it
central to the design and work of this body of law and institutions. The key idea
behind this concept in international human rights law is that States have the
primary obligation to respect and ensure human rights under their jurisdic-
tion. It is they that sign treaties, accept obligations, create international
institutions, and transfer specific powers and functions to such bodies, but
they do so under the assumption that it is the States’ primary task to fulfil the
international obligations that bind them. This means that when alleged
violations take place, States have the prerogative to provide remedies to victims
to address those violations. Only if States fail to act as expected under inter-
national law can international responses be triggered.11
Samantha Besson has identified three forms of subsidiarity at work in
international human rights law: procedural, substantive, and remedial. Her
classification aims to make normative sense of existing law and practice under
human rights law, where explicit reference to subsidiarity is rare.12 Procedural
subsidiarity refers to the establishment of institutions and procedures at both
the domestic and international levels to monitor and protect human rights,
and the relationship of complementarity that exists between those
institutions.13 In the context of international tribunals, Besson defines it as
‘the actual power or competence of the international human rights court or
body to review’.14 In other words, what Besson calls procedural subsidiarity in
international human rights adjudication is the legal recognition made by
States that if they have failed to comply with their human rights obligations,
international quasi-judicial and judicial bodies are able to adjudicate on those
alleged violations.
Besson also identifies substantive subsidiarity. According to her, this type of
subsidiarity refers to the scope of the powers granted to international bodies to
11 Gerald L Neuman, ‘Subsidiarity’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 360–3.
12 Ibid.; Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law’ (n. 8), 78.
13 Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law’ (n. 8), 77.
14 Ibid., 78.
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protect ‘the minimal and abstract content of . . . rights against domestic
levelling-down’.15 This type of subsidiarity is at stake once procedural subsidi-
arity has been triggered, because only when a body is able to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a case can a discussion about the extent of its powers over the
interpretation of specific rights take place.
Finally, Besson refers to remedial subsidiarity, which can be defined as the
extent of the power conferred to the international body to order remedies that
have to be provided by the State after the body finds that international human
rights obligations have been breached – that is, after the body has been able to
exercise substantive subsidiarity.
Human rights law incorporates various legal rules to safeguard subsidiar-
ity. They are found in treaties, in the statutes, or in rules of procedure of
international bodies, and they have been further developed in jurispru-
dence. They aim to provide legal certainty as to what powers these inter-
national bodies have and when they can be triggered. Examples of rules
fleshing out subsidiarity in human rights law include the requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies and the fourth-instance doctrine.
According to the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, no case can be
brought before a judicial or quasi-judicial international body until all
relevant domestic remedies have been exhausted at the domestic level.
While there are internationally accepted exceptions to this rule, such as
when domestic remedies are not adequate or effective, the rule is broadly
supported internationally.16 Furthermore, the application of the rule has
become stricter in recent years, as has the potential application of excep-
tions to it.17 In turn, the fourth-instance doctrine notes that international
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies cannot act as a court of fourth instance on
top of domestic courts. In other words, they are not appellate courts that
can quash domestic rulings18 and hence, when placed in a situation in
which they can act as fourth instance, they should exercise judicial
15 Ibid., 77.
16 See, e.g., Art. 5 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Art. 35 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221; Art.
46(1)(a) and (2) ACHR; Arts 50 and 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR), 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217.
17 See, e.g., Raffaela Kunz, ‘A Further “Constitutionalisation” to the Detriment of the
Individual? On the ECtHR Stricter Reading of the Principle of Subsidiarity Regarding the
Admissibility of Cases’, Völkerrechtsblog, 27 August 2018, available at https://voelkerrechtsblog
.org/a-further-constitutionalization-to-the-detriment-of-the-individual/.
18 See CIDH, Laureano Brizuela Wilde (Mexico), Report on Admissibility, Report No. 64/14,
Petition 806–06, 25 July 2014, para. 43.
184 Clara Sandoval
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/23753176/WORKINGFOLDER/CORREA-RG/9781108480956C03.3D 185 [179–264] 22.8.2020
10:14AM
restraint.19 These two examples illustrate requirements that must be met for
procedural subsidiarity to be triggered.
Some consider that remedial subsidiarity ‘protects the States’ choice of
remedial means’, as Besson argues,20 and therefore that tribunals should
grant great subsidiarity to States to deal with reparation. Others, such as
Dinah Shelton, believe that tribunals should exercise the jurisdiction they
have been granted when States, having had the opportunity to remedy the
situation, do not act accordingly.21 How far international bodies can go in
awarding reparation for victims of armed conflict is as much a question about
how should one understand subsidiarity in such a context as it is about how
remedial subsidiarity is framed by relevant human rights treaties. In the
European system, for example, this question depends on the interpretation
of Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This
provision limits the powers of the Court on reparation to just satisfaction ‘if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made’ and ‘if necessary’.
Often, in the literature on subsidiarity and on legal discussions, one
encounters references to ‘complementarity’ as either a term synonymous
with subsidiarity or an entirely different term. The discussion on complemen-
tarity has gained currency particularly under international criminal law,
where the preamble to the Rome Statute states that ‘the International
Criminal Court . . . shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions’.22 This principle is further reiterated in the first Article of the
treaty. However, doctrine on complementarity under the Rome Statute
appears to refer to subsidiarity. Mohamed El Zeidy, for example, defines it
as a principle that ‘requires the existence of both national and international
criminal justice functioning in a subsidiary manner for the repression of
crimes of international law. When the former fails to do so, the latter inter-
venes and ensures that perpetrators do not go unpunished.’23 Equally, Luke
Moffett considers that complementarity is ‘meant to protect the sovereignty of
states by recognising their primary responsibility to prosecute and punish
perpetrators of international crimes, due to their obligations under the
19 ECtHR, Note by the Jurisconsult, Interlaken Follow-up, Principle of Subsidiarity,
8 July 2010, 11.
20 Ibid., 82.
21 Dinah Shelton, ‘The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Tribunals on Remedies for Human
Rights Violations’, in J.F. Flauss (ed.) International Protection of Human Rights and Victims’
Rights, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2009), 57–75 (59).
22 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3.
23 MohamedM. El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: ANewMachinery to Implement
International Criminal Law’,Michigan Journal of International Law 23 (2002), 869–975 (870).
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Rome Statute and international law’.24 This is very similar to the idea under-
pinning subsidiarity under human rights law, according to which States are
obliged to respect and ensure the rights they have recognised, including the
obligations deriving from them, and only if they do not do other international
mechanisms gain jurisdiction over such matters.
As this discussion on complementarity shows, complementarity and sub-
sidiarity are closely related concepts. Complementarity is clearly an element
of subsidiarity, but goes beyond it. One can identify at least two potential
dimensions of complementarity. First is one that denotes its negative or
reactive dimension, whereby international mechanisms are somehow residual
because they are triggered to act or adjudicate only in the absence of relevant
action by domestic systems (be it in human rights law or under international
criminal law). This dimension is captured by the definitions given by Moffett
and El Zeidy. This concept of complementarity can be taken as synonymous
with subsidiarity. The second dimension, and a dimension of great import-
ance, is positive complementarity, meaning that international mechanisms
have powers to identify and define the reach and scope of international
obligations, as well as to foster an environment of compliance with them.
This element is not apparent in those definitions. At the International
Criminal Court (ICC), for example, the Office of the Prosecutor, in interpret-
ing its mandate under the Rome Statute, considers that encouraging ‘genuine
national proceedings where possible, including in situation countries, relying
on its various networks of cooperation, but without involving the Office
directly in capacity building or financial or technical assistance’,25 would
promote a positive approach to complementarity.
The concept of complementarity is not alien to human rights law. It is
found, for example, in the preamble to the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) when it states that human rights ‘justify inter-
national protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complement-
ing the protection provided by domestic law of the American States’. Such
reference to complementarity emphasises the functional role that inter-
national human rights institutions are called upon to play.26 However,
note that, here, the reference to complementarity is to the Convention
itself and not to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights or
IACtHR as guardians of the instrument. Thus any discussion about
24 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (New York:
Routledge, 2014), 51.
25 International Criminal Court, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, 11 February 2010, para. 17.
26 Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law’ (n. 8), 77.
186 Clara Sandoval
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/23753176/WORKINGFOLDER/CORREA-RG/9781108480956C03.3D 187 [179–264] 22.8.2020
10:14AM
remedial subsidiarity should also include a reflection on how complemen-
tarity in general, and positive complementarity in particular, could be
fostered in this area. As a consequence, the relationship between these
two terms is of relevance to this chapter and will be specifically addressed
in section VI.
III. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE ON REPARATION
The Inter-American Court has the authority to award reparation under Article
63(1) of the ACHR, which states:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also
rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that
constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party.
In interpreting this provision, the IACtHR has consistently maintained that
States have an obligation to provide integral, full, or adequate reparation to
victims whose rights under the ACHR or other applicable treaties have been
violated.27 Indeed, the Court has stated that:
Reparation for damages caused by a violation of an international obligation
requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which is
to reinstate the situation that existed prior to the commission of the violation.
If, as in the instant case, full restitution is not possible, an international court
must order a series of measures that will safeguard the violated rights, redress
the consequences that the violations engendered, and order payment of
compensation for the damages caused.28
27 In Spanish, the jurisprudence of the Court, as a general rule, refers to ‘integral reparation’,
but in many cases it also uses the word ‘adequate’ to mean the same. Given that the word
‘adequate’ captures better the meaning given to the concept by the Court in English, this
chapter will use the term ‘adequate’ rather than ‘integral’. See, e.g., IACtHR, Ituango
v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 1 July 2006, paras 341 and 345. See also
Clara Sandoval-Villalba, ‘The Concepts of Injured Party and Victim of Gross Human
Rights Violations in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
A Commentary on their Implications for Reparations’, in Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz,
and Alan Stephens (eds), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff,
2009), 243–82.
28 IACtHR, Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 3 December 2001, para. 41.
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This position has been upheld by the Court since its judgment in Velásquez
Rodrı́guez v. Honduras.29 According to the Court, this obligation has the status
of customary law, and it requires the existence of a direct causal link between
the violation found by the Court and the harm caused.30While Article 63(1) of
the Convention includes the words ‘if appropriate’, suggesting that the Court
does not always need to award reparation, these words have been omitted from
any interpretation of this provision by the Commission or the Court, or by
relevant stakeholders in the region.31
In application of this principle, the Court has awarded various forms of
reparation to victims of violations under the Convention or other applicable
treaties, particularly to victims who are in a vulnerable situation, such as
women, children, indigenous peoples, or those who suffered gross and system-
atic human rights violations as a result of armed conflict or dictatorships.32
The Court has even stated, albeit in obiter dictum, that reparations should
be transformative, meaning that reparations can never bring a person back to
a situation of discrimination, but rather should change those conditions.33
Another key feature of the reparations jurisprudence of the Court is its
relatively flexible concept of ‘victim’. According to its Rules of Procedure,
a victim is ‘a person whose rights have been violated, according to a judgment
emitted by the Court’.34 This means that the Court could recognise as victim
any person who has proven that their rights were violated. This could include
next of kin of persons who have suffered gross human rights violations or
others. The Rules even indicate that ‘when it has not been possible to identify
one or more of the alleged victims who figure in the facts of the case because it
concerns massive or collective violations, the Tribunal shall decide whether to
consider those individuals as victims’.35
This provision is particularly significant when the Court has to deal
with gross human rights violations that took place in situations of armed
conflict, as was the case in El Mozote and Nearby Places.36 In this case, the
29 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, 21 July 1989, para. 25.
30 IACtHR, Ticona Estrada and Others v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
27 November 2008, para. 110.
31 Sandoval-Villalba, ‘The Concepts of Injured Party’ (n. 27).
32 IACtHR, Street Children v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, 26May 2001; IACtHR,Cotton
Field v. Mexico, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 16 November 2009;
IACtHR, Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 17 June 2005.
33 IACtHR, Cotton Field (n. 32), para. 450.
34 Rule 2 of the IACtHR Rules of Procedure, as approved in November 2009.
35 Ibid., Rule 35(2).
36 IACtHR, Massacres of El Mozote and Surrounding Areas v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, 25 October 2012.
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Inter-American Court dealt with various massacres that took place between 11
and 13 December 1981 in Morazán, El Salvador, where approximately 1,000
people were killed and in which there were clear difficulties identifying each
of the individual victims.37
As a result of its concept of adequate reparation, the Court has also recognised
various forms of reparation in its jurisprudence. The more serious the violations,
as is the case in situations of armed conflict, the more forms of reparation the
Court has awarded. The Court has issued orders against States regarding the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators of human rights
violations,38 restitution if applicable,39 compensation for pecuniary (consequen-
tial damages, loss of earnings) and non-pecuniary damages,40 and other forms of
reparation that include satisfaction measures,41 rehabilitation (primarily for men-
tal and physical care)42 and guarantees of non-repetition.43 The Court has even
recognised that reparations can be both individual and collective.44
The work of the Court has not stopped there. Besides these substantive
reparation principles, the Court has also crafted crucial procedural principles
on reparation. For instance, the Court has applied a flexible approach to the
standard and burden of proof in reparation, as illustrated by the value it
attributes to circumstantial evidence and presumptions ‘when they lead to
consistent conclusions as regards the facts of the case’.45 An example of this is
the Court’s presumption that all adults with a family spend most of their
income providing for the needs of their dependants, or that the killing or
disappearance of a loved one does serious emotional harm to the parents and
children of the victim.46 Equally, the Court has provided victims with the
37 Ibid., paras 1 and 310.
38 The Court has ordered the duty to investigate in almost all of its decisions concerning gross
human rights violations. See, e.g., IACtHR, Molina Theissen and Others v. Guatemala,
Reparations and Costs, 4 July 2004, paras 78–84.
39 IACtHR, Kakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, 24 August 2010, para. 288.
40 IACtHR, El Mozote (n. 36), paras 379–84.
41 IACtHR, Pueblo Bello v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 31 January 2006, para. 278.
42 IACtHR, Mapiripán v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 15 September 2005,
para. 312.
43 IACtHR, Rosendo Cantú and Others v. Mexico, Admissibility, Merits and Reparations,
16 November 2009, paras 203–86.
44 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations, 10 September 1993, para. 83; IACtHR,
Massacre of Plan de Sanchez, Reparations, 19 November 2004, paras 86, 94–111; IACtHR,
Saramaka v. Suriname, Admissibility, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 28 November 2007,
paras 188, 190–202.
45 IACtHR, Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Merits, 21 January 1994, para. 49.
46 IACtHR, Mapiripán (n. 42), paras 283–4; IACtHR, Gomez Paquiyauri v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, 8 July 2004, para. 218.
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opportunity to participate in proceedings, including in relation to reparation,
to explain the harm they have suffered and it has shown sensitivity in relation
to their different cultural backgrounds.47
As can be inferred from this section, the Court has crafted important
substantive and procedural principles to provide reparation to victims. In the
Americas region, these principles have allowed the Court to provide compre-
hensive reparations to victims of armed conflict in the absence of State action
to comply with the provisions of the ACHR. Indeed, the Court had to decide
many cases concerning gross human rights violations that occurred in times of
armed conflict in the region, including against Colombia, Peru, Guatemala,
and El Salvador. All of these countries have established their own domestic
reparation programmes.
A. Gross Human Rights Violations, Victims, and Domestic Reparation
Programmes in Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia
The three States of the region with the highest number of cases decided by the
IACtHR are Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia. The majority of cases against
these States also concern gross human rights violations that took place in the
midst of non-international armed conflict. These States have engaged with
more than one transitional justice mechanism to deal with the legacy of mass
atrocities, including truth commissions. These countries have used subsidiar-
ity as an argument to get the Court to order reparations by means of their own
domestic reparation programmes. Therefore, a closer look at these countries
and their domestic reparation programmes is important to set out the context
for analysis.
1. Guatemala
A non-international armed conflict took place in Guatemala between 1962
and 1996.48Various rebel groups were created in Guatemala to resist the State.
Those groups included the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes,
or FAR), the Organisation of the People in Arms (Organización del Pueblo en
Armas, or ORPA) and the Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres,
or EGP). All of these joined forces in 1982, giving life to the Guatemalan
47 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, 10 September 1993.
48 Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the
Commission for Historical Clarification – Conclusions and Recommendations,
25 February 1999, para. 1.
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National Revolutionary Unit (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca, or URNG).
According to the National Commission for Historical Clarification
(Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH), established in Guatemala
in 1994 as part of the Peace Agreement, the State responded to these armed
groups in a totally disproportionate manner, since ‘at no time during the
internal armed confrontation did the guerrilla groups have the military poten-
tial necessary to pose an imminent threat to the State’.49 The State’s response
was extremely violent and targeted in particular the Maya indigenous popula-
tion. While the armed conflict lasted various decades, the bloodiest period
took place between 1978 and 1984, during which time the CEH reports that at
least 91 per cent of all human rights violations took place.50 Violations
included torture, killings, enforced disappearance, forced displacement,
destruction of houses, health centres, and schools, as well as the destruction
of cultural sites and identity. All these violations, together with their systemic
and intentional nature, led the CEH to conclude that ‘agents of the State of
Guatemala, within this framework of counterinsurgency operations carried
out between 1981 and 1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of
Mayan people’.51 Peace talks began in 1987 and materialised in twelve peace
agreements in December 1996. Some of these agreements, such as the
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, recognised that:
[I]t is a humanitarian duty to compensate[52] and/or assist victims of human
rights violations. Said compensation and/or assistance shall be effected by
means of government measures and programmes of civil and socio-economic
nature addressed, as a matter of priority, to those whose need is greatest, given
their economic and social condition.53
The CEHwas established by one of the peace agreements. In its final report
of 1998, the CEH recommended, as a matter of urgency, the establishment of
a domestic reparation programme for victims of the armed conflict and their
next of kin.54 It is in this context that, five years after the report, a domestic
reparation programme was established in Guatemala in 2003, by means of
a gubernative agreement and not a law.55 While Guatemala has no official
49 Ibid., para. 24.
50 Ibid., para. 82.
51 Ibid., paras 108–26.
52 The UN English text of the Comprehensive Agreement for Human Rights translates resarci-
miento, i.e. reparation, as ‘compensation’, which is not accurate.
53 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, A/48/928, S/1994/448, 29March 1994, cl. VIII.
54 Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (n. 48), 49, at paras 7–21.
55 Guatemalan Government, Acuerdo Gubernativo 258–2003.
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registry of victims, the overall number is calculated to include between
130,000 and 200,000 people who were murdered, 50,000 who were disap-
peared, 1million who were internally displaced, 100,000 refugees, and 200,000
children who were orphaned.56 To identify the key principles that would
guide the domestic reparation programme, a concerted effort took place in
Guatemala that brought together civil society organisations, the government,
and other stakeholders. The result was the ‘Blue Book’, which contains all of
the reparation principles, including one that defines victims as ‘those who
suffered directly or indirectly, individually or collectively, human rights viola-
tions included in this programme’.57
Both the gubernative agreement and its amendments, and the Blue Book,
establish, in general terms, five forms of reparation for victims: restitution of
housing, land, or the like; compensation; reparation for cultural harm; satis-
faction measures, such as support with exhumations; and rehabilitation.58
Although the domestic reparation programme was in principle inspired by
a holistic view of reparation, in practice it has prioritised compensation and
lacks implementation.59 As Cristián Correa states elsewhere in this volume,
approximately 31,845 victims received compensation between 2005 and 2014.60
The original agreement indicated that 300 million Guatemalan quetzal
(approximately 37 million USD) would be given annually to the domestic
reparation programme, equivalent, more or less, to 1 per cent of the national
budget. The government has failed to provide the domestic reparation pro-
gramme with such allocation and the money the domestic reparation pro-
gramme has received annually – about 10 per cent of the original pledge – has
not been sufficient to provide reparation.61 Furthermore, the programme was
56 Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (n. 48), appendix, 71–73.
57 GuatemalanGovernment andCivil Society, Texto El Libro Azul (Politica de Resarcimiento),
2002, para. 59, 13, available at www.pnr.gob.gt/archivos/biblioteca/EL%20LIBRO%20AZUL
.pdf.
58 Acuerdo Gubernativo (n. 55), Art. 2; Texto El Libro Azul (n. 57), para. 68.
59 OHCHR, Informe Periódico del Estado de Guatemala al Comité de Derechos Humanos
sobre la Aplicación del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Polı́ticos, CCPR/C/GTM/
3, 10, para. 41, available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/AdvanceDocs/CCPR-C-
GTM3_sp.pdf, and Informe de la Evaluacion Conjunta del Programa Nacional de
Resarcimiento y de los Programas de Apoyo al PNR de GTZ y PNUD, 14 December 2007,
67, available at www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resou
rces/GT_Informe_Final_EC_PNR.pdf.
60 See Correa, ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’, Chapter 2 in this volume, section III.
B.1.a.
61 Impunity Watch, Monitoreo de la Justicia Transicional en Guatemala, vol. III, Derecho a la
Reparación para las Vı́ctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno, 2014, 31, available at www
.impunitywatch.org/docs/Tomo_III-compressed.pdf.
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originally established for ten years, and its renewal faced serious political,
financial, and legal obstacles.62 As indicated by civil society organisations at
a hearing before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in
December 2016, the domestic reparation programme was basically non-
operational in the year 2015–16 and victims continue to go without
reparation.63 During the hearing before the Commission, the State represen-
tative also recognised that reparations are a pending issue in Guatemala.64
2. Peru
Peru experienced a non-international armed conflict between 1980 and
2000.65 It was fought by the State, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or
SP) and other rebel groups, such as the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, or MRTA). The SP
declared war against the State, and both the State and the SP carried out
atrocious crimes. Indeed, an important finding of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Peru is that the SP was responsible
for 53.68 per cent of the deaths that occurred during the armed conflict.66 The
conflict also disproportionately impacted peasant and indigenous
communities.67 The bloodiest crimes took place in 1984, 1989 and 1990.68
With the fall of President Alberto Fujimori from power, a transitional govern-
ment led by Valentı́n Paniagua put in place important transitional justice
measures, the first of which was a Truth Commission, established in 2001, later
renamed the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.69 According to
the report of the TRC, there were approximately 69,280 persons killed or
disappeared in Peru during the armed conflict.70 The TRC also looked into
massacres, torture, sexual violence, violations of due process, and child rights
violations, among others.
As with the Guatemalan TRC, the TRC in Peru recommended the creation
of a domestic reparation programme, but, in contrast to Guatemala, it enacted
62 Ibid., 17.
63 CIDH, Hearing on the Right to Full Reparation for Victims of the Armed Conflict in
Guatemala, 6 December 2016, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XidZaM3yEE.
64 Ibid., Statement made by Victor Hugo Godoy, President of COPREDEH.
65 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe Final, Capitulo 1, 1.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., Capitulo 1, 2.
68 Ibid.
69 Supreme Resolution 304–2000-JUS, 9 December 2000, Art. 1; Supreme Decree 065–2001-
PCM, 4 June 2001.
70 Comisión de la Verdad, Informe Final (n. 65), Annex II.
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Law 28592/2005 to establish the reparation framework for victims of the armed
conflict.71 It also created a registry of victims, which includes 214,109 individ-
ual victims and beneficiaries, and 5,712 communities registered for collective
reparation. The domestic reparation programme, which Cristián Correa
explains well,72 included six different forms of reparation: a citizens’ rights
restitution programme; measures on education; measures on health; collect-
ive reparations; symbolic reparations; and housing.73 Compensation was
envisaged for the next of kin of those who were killed or disappeared, or
persons who, as a result of attacks or torture, were left with permanent disabil-
ity, and for rape victims.
This programme has been particularly praised for its approach to collective
reparations. While, under international law, there is no treaty defining the
concept of collective reparation, in practice this term has been used in
multiple settings by the ICC, other supranational bodies such as the
IACtHR and various domestic reparation programmes. They provided repar-
ation not to an individual who suffered harm as a result of a human rights
violation, but to a group of people ‘to alleviate the collective harm that has
been caused as a consequence of a violation of international law of either
individual or collective rights’.74 An example of a collective form of reparation
is a development project to provide a community with water or sewage
systems. In the case of Peru, the domestic reparation programme finances
small infrastructure projects in specific communities for a total cost of up to
100,000 Peruvian soles (approximately 33,000 USD). The projects are chosen
in consultation with the community and they must fit one of the modalities
established in the domestic reparation programme, such as recovery and
reconstruction of the economic, productive, and trade infrastructure, or the
recovery and expansion of education, health care, sanitation, and other similar
services. Up until 2016, approximately 2,350 collective reparation projects had
been financed by the State.75 Accordingly, this represents 40.70 per cent of the
total number of collective victims in Peru.76
71 Congreso de la Republica, Ley n. 28592, 29 July 2005, available at www.mimp.gob.pe/home
mimp/direcciones/ddcp/normas/4_5_Ley_28592_Crea_el_PIR.pdf.
72 See Correa, ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’, Chapter 2 in this volume, section II.B.
73 Ley n. 28592 (n. 71), art. 2.
74 Diana Odier-Contreras Garduno, Collective Reparations: Tensions and Dilemmas between
Collective Reparations with the Individual Rights to Receive Reparations (Antwerpen:
Intersentia, 2018), 23–4.
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3. Colombia
A non-international armed conflict has also taken place in Colombia since the
1960s. The signing of the peace agreement in 2016 did not put a full end to the
conflict and negotiations are still ongoing with the National Liberation Army
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN). Besides the ELN, other armed
groups involved in the armed conflict have included the Revolutionary Armed
Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, or FARC), the State armed forces
and various paramilitary groups. Each has committed serious international
crimes, some amounting to serious human rights violations and/or serious
violations of humanitarian law, including massacres, disappearances, torture,
sexual violence, displacement, and extrajudicial killings.
Negotiations took place between the government and paramilitary groups to
secure their demobilisation.77 As a result of this, the Justice and Peace Law78
was adopted, setting the foundations of a transitional justice system, primarily
judicial, to investigate and punish with alternative sanctions the atrocities
committed by those that would demobilise. This justice mechanism also
included, as the main form of redress, an incidente de reparación, meaning
that, at the same time as there is a criminal trial against the perpetrators,
victims are able to claim reparation from the perpetrator as part of the trial.
The Justice and Peace Law also established the National Commission for
Reparation and Reconciliation to, among other functions, make recom-
mendations to the government on collective forms of redress and to follow
up on the incidente de reparación. However, this reparation mechanism,
basically conceived to provide victims with reparation according to the harm
they suffered in each case, proved to be unworkable for two reasons: first,
reparation was made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific
facts and harms of each case; and second, criminal justice takes time – so
much so that, after a decade of work of the Justice and Peace Law, there had
been only thirty-four judgments.79 As a result, a domestic reparation pro-
gramme became a necessity in the country, with more than 8million victims.
77 CIDH, Truth, Justice and Reparation: Report on the Situation of HumanRights in Colombia,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/13, 31December 2013, paras 53–4, available at www.oas.org/en/iachr/
reports/pdfs/Colombia-Truth-Justice-Reparation.pdf.
78 Ibid., para. 51. See also CIDH, Statement by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on the Application and Scope of the Justice and Peace Law inColombia, OEA/Ser/LV/
II.125 Doc. 15, 1 August 2006, para. 8, available at www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colombia2006e
ng/Pronunciamiento.8.1.06eng.htm.
79 OAS, Vigésimo Primer Informe Semestral del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente
sobre la Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la Organización de los Estados
Americanos (MAAPP/OEA), OEA/Ser.G, CP/Doc.5194/16, 27 May 2016, 8.
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The Victims and Land Restitution Law was enacted in 2011 to put the
programme in place.80 This domestic reparation programme pre-dates the
signing of the peace agreement between the government and the FARC in
2016; under the peace agreement, it remains the key mechanism to provide
reparation to victims, although it is complemented by other reparation meas-
ures for peacebuilding.81 In the words of the peace agreement, ‘existing
mechanisms will be strengthened, [and] new measures will be adopted’.82
Among the new measures are collective reparation for the most affected
communities and territories in the country, acts of acknowledgement of
responsibility, and public apologies by the government, the FARC, and
others.83 The FARC will also carry out particular reparation activities, such
as ‘participating in infrastructure rebuilding work in the areas most affected by
the conflict and in programmes to clear such areas of anti-personnel mines, . . .
participat[ing] in programmes to substitute crops used for illicit purposes, . . .
and participat[ing] in programmes to repair environmental damages’.84
According to theColombian national registry, at time of writing (August 2020),
there have been 9,031,048 victims, of whom 1,226,121 are victims of killings or
disappearances and 8,047,756 are victims of internal displacement.85 The
Colombian domestic reparation programme has been considered the ‘cutting-
edge of reparation programmes worldwide’,86 given that it is an incredibly
ambitious programme aiming to provide transformative reparation to millions
of victims, including individual and collective forms of redress, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and other measures. Furthermore, it provides a full
framework to provide land restitution to victims.87
Another important feature of the Colombian reparation landscape is the fact
that victims can also claim reparation before the contentious-administrative
80 Congreso de la Republica, Ley 1448 de 2011, por la cual se dictan medidas de atención,
asistencia y reparación integral a las vı́ctimas del conflicto armado interno y se dictan otras
disposiciones (Ley de Victimas), 10 June 2011, available at www.justiciatransicional.gov.co/si
tes/default/files/LEY-1448-DE-2011-LEY-DE-VICTIMAS-DIARIO-OFICIAL.pdf.




85 Colombian Government, Single Registry of Victims, available at www.unidadvictimas.gov.co
/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394 [accessed August 2020].
86 Kathryn Sikkink et al., Evaluation of Integral Reparations Measures in Colombia, Executive
Summary (Boston: Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2015), 2
and 15.
87 Ley de Victimas (n. 80), art. 25. See also Correa, ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’,
Chapter 2 in this volume, section II, which provides a more detailed account of each of the
reparation measures included in this domestic reparation programme.
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jurisdiction through the writ of direct reparation for antijuridical harm caused
by the State.88 This chapter focuses on domestic reparation programmes and,
for that reason, will not address this feature of the Colombian system. However,
it certainly makes the Colombian reparation landscape more complex, chal-
lenging, and sui generis.
B. The Jurisprudence of the Court on Domestic Reparation Programmes: From
Rectification to Deference
It is against this background of domestic reparation programmes, and those set
up in countries such as Chile, Argentina, or Brazil that were moving away
from dictatorships, that the Inter-American Court has been asked to adjudi-
cate on cases concerning gross human rights violations and to provide
adequate redress in the holistic terms it has crafted over the years.
The cases of Massacre of Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala and Génesis
v. Colombia illustrate the rectification and deference tendencies of the
IACtHR. Massacre of Plan de Sánchez and Génesis were decided in 2004
and 2013, respectively, almost a decade apart.
Massacre of Plan de Sánchez is emblematic of the old approach of the
Court – that for which the jurisprudence of the Court has been praised. The
case concerns a massacre that took place in 1982 during which more than
268 persons were killed by the Guatemalan military and others acting with
their acquiescence; many more suffered other serious human rights violations,
such as torture, rape, displacement, and denial of justice.89 Guatemala
acknowledged its international responsibility in the case for multiple viola-
tions of the American Convention, but it argued that any form of reparation
ordered by the Court should be implemented through its own domestic
reparation programme.90The Court abstained from examining the arguments
presented by Guatemala in relation to the domestic reparation programme
and fully applied its holistic approach to reparation, awarding measures
ranging from compensation to guarantees of non-repetition (see Table 3.1).
88 See, e.g., the IACtHR cases of Manuel Cepeda Vargas (n. 19) or La Rochela Massacre
v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 11 May 2007, in which the Council of State
had already awarded some reparations to the victims. For more information, see
Genevieve Lessard, ‘Preventive Reparations at a Crossroads: The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and Colombia’s Search for Peace’, International Journal of Human Rights 22
(2018), 1209–28.
89 IACtHR,Massacre of Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala, Merits, 29 April 2004, paras 42–52 (45).
90 Presidencia de la República, COPREDEH, 21 May 2004, RED-A-28–2004, points 7, 15.
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table 3.1 Massacre of Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala (2004)






Satisfaction Public act acknowledging State
responsibility in the village of
Plan de Sánchez, with the
presence of high-ranking State
authorities and with the
members of the different
communities affected, in
Spanish and in Maya-Achi92
To the members of
the community
Translation of the judgment of the
Court into Maya-Achi93
To the members of
the community
Publication in a national
newspaper of national
circulation of the proven facts of
the case and other parts of the
judgment94




25,000USD for the members of the
community as guarantee of non-
repetition and to honour the
collective memory of the
victims, to be used to maintain
the chapel in which the victims
pay homage to those who were
executed during the massacre95
To the members of
the community
Restitution Housing programme for the
surviving victims of the massacre
who lost their homes as a result
of the State’s actions96
To all victims
Rehabilitation Medical and psychological




91 Ibid.,IACtHR, Massacre of Plan de Sánchez (n. 89), para. 99.
92 Ibid., paras 100–1.
93 Ibid., para. 102.
94 Ibid., para. 103.
95 Ibid., para. 104.
96 Ibid., para. 105.
97 Ibid., paras 106–8.
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Reparations in Plan de Sánchez awarded by the Court aimed at rectifying
the situation of vulnerability in which surviving victims were left and which
deprived them of the possibility of a decent life. The Court recognised that,
during the massacre, vast damage was caused to all things that made the
livelihood of the community possible. It presumed that all of this was done
at a cost and awarded 5,000 USD to each victim for material damages.102
Equally, the Court ordered the State to implement a programme to provide
surviving victims living in the village with adequate housing, and to provide
them with free physical and mental health care, including medications.103
Furthermore, the Court ordered the State to implement certain pro-
grammes ‘in addition to the public works financed by the national budget
table 3.1 (continued)
Forms of Reparation Specific Form of Reparation Beneficiaries
Collective reparation Development programmes for the
members of the community
(dissemination of Maya-Achi
culture, maintenance and
improvement of roads in the
area, sewage system and potable
water supply, supply of teaching
personnel with intercultural
skills and establishment of
a health centre)98
To the members of
the community
Compensation Pecuniary damages 5,000 USD per
victim99
Non-pecuniary damages 20,000 USD per
victim100
Legal costs 55,000 USD to the Centre for
Human Rights Legal Action
(Centro para la Acción Legal en
derechos Humanos, or
CALDH)101
98 Ibid., paras 109–11.
99 Ibid., para. 75.
100 Ibid., 88.
101 Ibid., paras 115–16. The CALDH is the Guatemalan non-governmental organisation that
represented the victims before the Court.
102 IACtHR, Massacre of Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala, Reparations, 19 November 2004,
para. 74.
103 Ibid., paras 105–11.
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allocated to that region or municipality’.104 Those programmes included:
a sewage system and potable water supply; the supply of teaching personnel
for primary and secondary schools in the communities affected; the establish-
ment of a health centre with adequate personnel and the ability to provide
medical and psychological care to those affected; and the study and dissemin-
ation of the Maya-Achi culture. Thus the Court was not only repairing the
harm that took place during and as a consequence of the massacre, but it was
also rectifying a situation that it considered contrary to the spirit of inter-
national human rights law. In a case such as this, the Court exercised full
jurisdiction over reparations and there was no consideration of subsidiarity as
a potential tool to deal with reparation.
The Court decided many other cases like Plan de Sánchez similarly.105
However, in contrast to Plan de Sánchez and to its jurisprudence, a different
and more nuanced approach to reparations is seen in the Court’s judgment in
Operation Génesis v. Colombia.106 This case relates to a military operation
(Operation Génesis) carried out in the area of the Salaquı́ and Truando rivers
between 24 and 27 February 1997, which resulted in the killing of Marino López
Mena and the displacement of hundreds of members of the Afro-descendant
communities of the Cacarica river. In this case, the Court identified 372 victims,
of whom 341 were displaced persons.107 This is also the first judgment against
Colombia in which theCourt considers that Colombia violated Article 22ACHR
(freedom of movement) as a result of the displacement of the Cacarica commu-
nities caused during themilitary operation.108Colombia failed to ensure the right
to personal integrity and not to be displaced forcibly of the Cacarica communi-
ties, and it offered insufficient basic assistance after that displacement.109
In Génesis, a discussion arose about ‘the sufficiency of the measures
included in the Victims and Land Restitution Law to make reparation to the
victims’.110 Indeed, Colombia used the subsidiarity argument, arguing that its
‘administrative reparation programme constitutes an effective remedy for the
fulfilment of the right to reparation, which needs to be exhausted before going
104 Ibid., para. 110.
105 See, e.g., IACtHR, Mapiripán (n. 42); IACtHR, Ituango (n. 27); IACtHR, Pueblo Bello (n. 41);
IACtHR, El Mozote (n. 36).
106 IACtHR,Case of the Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin
(Operation Génesis) v. Colombia, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
20 November 2013.
107 Ibid., para. 431.
108 Ibid., para. 290.
109 Ibid., paras 322–4.
110 Ibid., para. 414.
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to the Inter-American System’.111 It also added that ‘based on the principle of
subsidiarity, the [court should] abstain from ordering any reparation because
the presumed victims had not requested reparations before the contentious-
administrative jurisdiction, which was the competent jurisdiction’.112
In contrast to Plan de Sánchez, the Court partly accepted the argument
made by Colombia about its domestic reparation programme, but it still
ordered additional forms of reparation or qualified its orders. Table 3.2 out-
lines the forms of reparation awarded by the Court.
Table 3.2 illustrates that the Court has used deference to Colombia’s
domestic reparation programme in the case of Génesis in relation to those
forms of reparation included in the programme: compensation, rehabilitation,
and restitution. The following subsections explain the orders given by the
Court in this area and why they differ from the standard approach of the Court
in cases such as Plan de Sánchez.
1. Rehabilitation
In relation to rehabilitation, the Court considered that the victims in the case
were entitled to timely health care, according to its substantive standards on
rehabilitation as in Plan de Sánchez. However, it referred the victims to the
services of the national health system as established in Colombia’s domestic
reparation programme, stating that:
[T]he State must provide this treatment through the national health services,
and to this end, the victims should access the domestic reparation programs to
which this judgment refers . . ., specifically the programs established to imple-
ment the measures of rehabilitation. The victims should be given immediate
and priority access to health care services, regardless of the corresponding time
frames established by domestic law, avoiding obstacles of any kind.113
This position differs from the Court’s stance in other similar cases against
Colombia, such as Santo Domingo, decidedmore than a year after the Victims
and Land Restitution Law was adopted in 2011. Santo Domingo also involved
a military operation, one carried out in December 1998, which culminated
with the killing of various persons and displacement of others.114 In that case,
111 República de Colombia, Alegatos Finales, Marino López y Otros (Operación Génesis),
March 2013, para. 469.
112 Ibid., para. 465.
113 Ibid., para. 453.
114 IACtHR, Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits and
Reparations, 30 November 2012, para. 3.
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table 3.2 Operation Génesis v. Colombia (2013)
Form of











Satisfaction116 Publication and dissemination of
the judgment
× ×
Public act to acknowledge
responsibility
× ×
Rehabilitation117 Free-of-charge and adequate
physical and mental care with




Restitution118 Restoration of the effective use,
enjoyment, and possession of
the territories to the Afro-
descendant communities
×
State guarantee that the conditions
of those places to be restored, as
well as those where victims are
currently located, shall be safe
and permit a decent life
×
No other forms of restitution




rehabilitation, and guarantees of
non-recurrence, etc.119
×




Compensation to next of kin of






115 Ibid., paras 439–40.
116 Ibid., paras 444–7.
117 Ibid., para. 453.
118 Ibid., para. 459.
119 Ibid., para. 461.
120 Ibid., para. 475.
121 Ibid., para. 476.
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the Court ordered the provision of rehabilitation measures, free of charge, for
the physical and mental health problems of each victim, with their previous
consent and the evaluation of their health problems, for as long as necessary,
including any specialised tests and access to free medicines. It also asked that
the services be provided in the nearest places to victims’ residences and that

























Legal costs 80,000 USD for the Inter-Church
Commission for Justice and
Peace (Comisión Intereclesial de
Justicia y Paz, or CIJP)123
122 If compensation ordered by the Court to Marino’s next of kin, including his siblings, is
compared with the compensation that an internally displaced family can get through
Colombia’s domestic reparation programme, the difference is alarming. A displaced family
group, regardless of how many persons are part of that family, would receive compensation
equivalent to seventeen times the minimum salary at the year of payment. In 2019, the
minimum salary in Colombia is 828,116 pesos. This means that an internally displaced family
would get 14,077,072 Colombian pesos – equivalent to 4,483.02 USD. This is less than
50 per cent of what each sibling of Marino was ordered to receive as pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages.
123 República de Colombia, Alegatos Finales, Marino López (n. 111), para. 481.
124 Ibid., para. 309.
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Santo Domingo is different from Génesis not only in relation to the institu-
tions charged with implementation of the rehabilitation measures, but also,
more fundamentally, in relation to the quality of the treatment that should be
provided. In Santo Domingo, as opposed to Génesis, the Court was very
specific about the quality of health services that should be provided, indicating
that it should include specialised tests and free medicines. While Colombia
did argue before the Court that it had enacted the Victims and Land
Restitution Law, the Court considered there to be no reliable evidence to
show that victims were accessing the services provided for in that Law or that
access to the health system was for harm suffered as a result of the violations.125
2. Restitution and Development Measures
In Plan de Sánchez, the Court ordered housing for the victims who had lost
theirs as a result of Guatemala’s actions. The Court also ordered important
collective forms of reparation, including various development projects in the
community.126 In contrast, and despite the fact that Génesis was the first case
against Colombia – the second in the overall jurisprudence of the Court – in
which displacement was found to have taken place in violation of the
Convention, the Court did not order any of the forms of restitution requested
by the victims, for example decent housing for women, various development
projects such as improvement of schools and construction of new ones, or the
provision of public services.127 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that ‘the
domestic reparation programs refer specifically to housing programs and to
land restitution mechanisms, as well as to other measures of rehabilitation,
satisfaction and non-repetition. Consequently, the victims in this case should
also have access to these other forms of reparation within, at most, one year of
notification of this judgment.’128
3. Compensation
Compensation in Plan de Sánchez was ordered for both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages for all victims. The Court used the equity principle to
calculate such harms in the absence of other evidence. The award for non-
125 Ibid., paras 305 and 307–9.
126 Development measures are not necessarily restitution. However, the Court dealt with them
under that heading. Development measures could be forms of rectifying a wrongful situation
rather than simply restoring victims back to the status quo ante.
127 IACtHR, Génesis (n. 106), paras 455–6.
128 Ibid., para. 461.
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pecuniary damages was relatively high, amounting to 20,000 USD in 2004 for
each of the victims. In the case of Colombia, this was one of the strongly
contested issues during the litigation. Colombia argued that its domestic
reparation programme ‘was the only way to satisfy the right to adequate,
prompt and effective reparation of the victims of displacement in Colombia,
including, if any, those that the Court recognizes as victims in this case’.129
The Commission considered that reparations ‘could not be channelled
through and satisfied by this law, because: (a) it is a new law that is being
implemented and adjusted, and (b) it distorts the nature of the Inter-American
System and its scope’.130 Indeed, a powerful argument put forward by the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights was that if victims have a right to
reparation as a result of violations that have been adjudicated on at the
international level, it is wrong, as a matter of principle, to impose on those
victims new obligations and to expect them to go through new procedures at
the domestic level to make that right effective.131
The representatives of the applicants maintained that the Victims Law:
. . . was insufficient, given the magnitude of the harm caused, as well as the
nature and amount of the reparations that it included . . ., [that] the compen-
sation that it provides for displaced persons is unclear and includes items that
are not applicable in this specific case; also, that it confuses the provision of
services for the displaced population with reparations.132
The Court considered important efforts to be taking place in Colombia to
provide reparation in that the victims inGénesis could benefit from individual
and collective reparation, and that the principle of complementarity cannot
be disregarded.133 The Court recalled in the judgment that it had used
complementarity in other cases to ‘acknowledge the compensation granted
at the domestic level . . ., when it is pertinent’.134
As a result, the Court ordered Colombia to pay compensation, in the
quantum established by the domestic reparation programme (seventeen
times the minimum salary at the moment of payment in Colombia per
129 Ibid., para. 463.
130 Ibid., para. 464; CIDH, Observaciones Finales Escritas, Marino López y Otros (Operación
Génesis) Colombia, 13 March 2013, paras 115–16.
131 Observaciones Finales Escritas, Marino López (n. 130), para. 115.
132 Ibid., paras 50–73.
133 It must be noted that the cases referred to by the Court as cases in which it has respected the
principle of complementarity are cases against Colombia: IACtHR, Santo Domingo (n. 123);
IACtHR, Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, 26 May 2010.
134 IACtHR, Génesis (n. 106), para. 474.
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displaced family), to internally displaced persons within a year of the notifica-
tion of the judgment regardless of any time bar.135 Its approach to Marino
López and his siblings was rather different. The Court considered that the next
of kin suffered various types of harm that were a direct consequence of López’s
death, such as the cruel circumstances of his passing and the fact that no one
had been punished for this act in over fifteen years.136 A similar consideration
of ensuing harm of internally displaced persons (IDPs) could have also taken
place. However, the Court abstained from doing that, ordering compensation
in equity for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm caused at a rate of 70,000
USD for Marino’s companion, 35,000 USD for each of his children, and
10,000 USD for each of his siblings.137
WhatGénesis shows is that theCourt is ready to play a subsidiary role in relation
to some forms of reparation, but that it may condition themodes of compliance of
such orders. I refer to this as ‘qualified deference’.138 The Court does so by, for
example, prescribing when the State has to provide the measure (immediately or
within a year of the judgment) or by ordering priority treatment to victims.
But the Court has also shown other forms of deference to domestic systems
in cases against Guatemala and Peru. In contrast to its approach to Colombia,
the Court has been more cautious with those States, possibly because of the
lack of evidence regarding the strengths of their domestic reparation pro-
grammes or as a result of bad litigation. For example, two other massacres,
Rı́o Negro and Chichupac, were adjudicated by the Court in 2012 and 2017.
The Rı́o Negro Massacres case139 concerned five massacres against the Mayan
community of Rı́o Negro in which enforced disappearances, arbitrary killings,
displacement, and torture took place, and which the State failed to investigate
with due diligence. The massacres occurred between 1980 and 1982.140
Guatemala claimed that some victims had received reparation under its
domestic reparation programme.141 The representatives of the victims agreed
that some compensation had been paid to some victims, but they argued that it
did not constitute ‘adequate’ reparation.142
135 Ibid., para. 475.
136 Ibid., para. 476.
137 Ibid.
138 Clara Sandoval, ‘Two Steps forward, One Step back: Reflections on the Jurisprudential Turn
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Domestic Reparation Programmes’,
International Journal of Human Rights 22 (2018), 1192–208 (1204).
139 IACtHR, Rı́o Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, 4 September 2012.
140 Ibid., paras 68–82.
141 Ibid., para. 297.
142 Ibid., para. 299.
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The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights recognised the efforts of
the Guatemalan State to implement the domestic reparation programme, but
considered that ‘this program does not guarantee that . . . [victims of human
rights violations] will receive reparation in a manner consistent with inter-
American standards’.143 As a result, it requested the Court to ‘take them into
account when ordering compensation so that they can be subtracted from the
final amount ordered’ in favour of the victims.144
The Court, following the views of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, ordered compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary dam-
ages in favour of the victims, arguing that it had to wipe out the harm caused by
the violations declared in the judgment. Nevertheless, it indicated that:
[T]he amounts that have already been awarded to the victims in this case at
the domestic level under the domestic reparation programme must be recog-
nized as part of the reparation due to them and subtracted from the amounts
established by the Court in this judgment for compensation. At the state of
monitoring compliance, the State must provide proof of the effective delivery
of the amounts ordered under said program.145
The Court upheld its own reparation standards, but recognised that reparation
through the domestic reparation programme was already a contribution
towards that end to the extent that compensation under that programme was
effectively paid to the victims. Thus it did not completely disregard
Guatemalan efforts.
In the judgments on Members of the Chichupac Village and other
Communities in the Municipality of Rabinal,146 the Court followed its
approach in Rı́o Negro. The case related to a massacre in Chichupac in
January 1982 and to various gross human rights violations, such as enforced
disappearances, torture, sexual violence, extrajudicial executions, and forced
labour, which occurred between 1981 and 1986.147Guatemala claimed to have
a strong domestic reparation programme that should be used to provide
redress to the victims and even considered it problematic that the Court:
. . . could in fact be a parallel mechanism for the redress of some victims of the
armed conflict . . ., with different procedures and forms of reparation to
143 Ibid., para. 298.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., para. 304.
146 IACtHR, Miembros de la Aldea Chichupac y Comunidades Vecinas delMunicipio de Rabinal
vs. Guatemala, Admissibility, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 30 November 2016 (available
only in Spanish at time of writing).
147 Ibid., paras 75–123.
Human Rights Adjudication, Subsidiarity, and Reparation 207
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/23753176/WORKINGFOLDER/CORREA-RG/9781108480956C03.3D 208 [179–264] 22.8.2020
10:15AM
determine beneficiaries of reparation and to define the forms and amount of
reparation that not only go beyond the financial capacity of the State, but that
also obstruct the adequate work of the [domestic reparation programme].148
The legal representatives criticised the programme, alleging that it faced
serious operationalisation problems and indicating that compensation under
the programme was not in accordance with international standards, because it
did not address moral damage nor did it cover all violations of the conflict,
such as internal displacement.149
The Commission, instead, articulated new arguments to explain to the
Court the irrelevance of the domestic reparation programme when adjudicat-
ing on the case. For the Commission, victims before the Court had already
litigated domestically and exhausted domestic remedies, and the judgments of
the Court had a different reach and scope from that of domestic reparations.150
The Court was persuaded by the views presented before it, particularly by the
fact that Guatemala could not prove that the domestic reparation programme
was, indeed, an adequate and effective remedy for the victims. As a consequence,
the Court considered that Guatemala had to provide victims with rehabilitation
of certain quality and with priority,151 and had also to provide compensation to
victims in the amount ordered by the Court.152 However, the Court recognised
that any compensation paid to victims for the same reasons for which the
judgment was handed down through the domestic reparation programme should
be discounted from the compensation to be paid to those beneficiaries.
As the judgments in Rı́o Negro and Chichupac illustrate, the IACtHR did
not give full prevalence to subsidiarity in relation to Guatemala as it tried to
reconcile its jurisprudence with the reparations given by the domestic repar-
ation programme, at least as regards compensation. Victims who had received
some form of compensation through the domestic reparation programme
could expect that portion to be deducted from any award made by the
Court.153
148 Ibid., para. 276.
149 Ibid., para. 277.
150 Ibid., para. 278.
151 Ibid., paras 302–4.
152 Ibid., paras 326–7.
153 One of the latest cases concerning gross human rights violations that occurred during the
armed conflict against Guatemala is IACtHR, Coc Max and Others (Massacre of Xamán)
v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparation and Legal Costs, 22 August 2018. In this case, Guatemala
argued that victims had benefited from its domestic reparation programme to stop the Court
from awarding reparation to victims. However, the Court did not entertain the argument,
given that it was presented ex temporis, and it awarded reparation to victims: ibid., para. 146.
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In respect of Peru, the State has also put forward its domestic reparation
programme to prevent the Court from awarding reparation. Most of the
Peruvian arguments have dealt with rehabilitation or compensation, arguing
that the victims in the cases are benefiting, or would benefit, from its domestic
reparation programme. In contrast to the Colombian cases, the Court has
ordered rehabilitation regardless of the service provided through Peru’s
domestic reparation programme.154 The Court has also awarded compensa-
tion according to its own jurisprudence, given the lack of evidence provided to
the Court by the State on the adequacy and effective payment of
compensation.155 Where relevant information has been provided to the
Court, such as on education as a form of reparation, the Court has ordered
the measure on the same terms as the domestic reparation programme.156
Thus the jurisprudence of the Court on Peru remains closer to that on
Guatemala than to that on Colombia.
C. The Judgments in Yarce and Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia:
Is the Court Revisiting Its Approach to Subsidiarity?
Up until time of writing (August 2020), the case in which the Court showed
greatest deference to a domestic reparation programme was Génesis v.
Colombia.157 Nevertheless, two other cases against Colombia have been
decided since Génesis in which Colombia’s domestic reparation programme
was also at stake, among them Yarce andVereda La Esperanza. Do they follow
the precedent in Génesis? Has the legal reasoning of the Court changed in
those cases? If so, why?
Yarce158 concerned five women human rights defenders who worked in
comuna 13 in Medellı́n (Colombia) and who suffered various violations as
a result of the Orion military operation.159 Two of them were under threat of
death and displaced; the other three were arbitrarily detained, two of them
154 IACtHR, Tenorio Roca et al. v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
22 June 2016, paras 281–4.
155 See IACtHR, Comunidad Campesina de Santa Barbara v. Peru, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparation and Costs, 1 September 2015, paras 333–6.
156 IACtHR, Tenorio Roca (n. 154), paras 294–8.
157 Genevieve Lessard, ‘Preventive Reparations at a Crossroads: The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and Colombia’s Search for Peace’, The International Journal of Human
Rights, 22 (2017), 1209–28 (1219 and 1222).
158 IACtHR, Yarce and Others v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, 22 November 2016.
159 Ibid., paras 75–125.
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displaced and one killed. The investigations into the violations were not
carried out with due diligence.160
While in Génesis the Court used the subsidiarity principle and ordered
compensation, rehabilitation, and restitution through Colombia’s domestic
reparation programmes, in Yarce the Court drew some important distinctions
between the two cases and crafted a more nuanced approach to subsidiarity.
Responding to Colombia’s argument that it should be allowed to redress
victims through its domestic reparation programme,161 the Court, following
Génesis, recognised that, in certain circumstances, the scope of the individual
right to reparation could be adjusted to provide redress to massive numbers of
victims, and that domestic reparation programmes are ‘a legitimate form to
fulfil this obligation and to allow reparations’.162Nevertheless, in an important
shift, the Court stated that, to uphold such a position:
Colombia would have to indicate not only in general terms the reparation
measures established in the Law, but would have had to determine and
individualise, in specific form or at least roughly, the way in which they
would apply to the victims in the case, with the goal to determine if, in
application of the complementarity principle, it was possible to refer the
matter to the domestic mechanisms. . . . [T]herefore if the possible referral to
domestic reparation programmes is at stake, sufficient information should be
submitted for the Court to assess the compensation that victims could obtain;
when that does not happen, the Court must establish the reparationmeasures
that it considers appropriate, among them compensation . . . .163
The position of the Court was based on the standard of evidence required for
a State to successfully argue before it that the State’s domestic reparation
programme could effectively provide reparation to victims. In Yarce, lack of
‘sufficient information’ prevented the Court from referring the case to the
domestic system. However, it did not explain what constitutes ‘sufficient
information’.164
160 Ibid., paras 101–25.
161 Ibid., para. 321.
162 Ibid., para. 326.
163 Ibid., para. 328 (translation by the author).
164 In this case, Colombia and the legal representatives of the victims requested an interpretation
of the judgment to the Court on various aspects, including the views of the Court on
reparation. Colombia, e.g., asked the Court to clarify what is needed to sufficiently support
claims that reparations at the domestic level are adequate. The Court limited itself to
repeating what it said in the judgment. See Yarce and Others v. Colombia, Interpretation of
Judgment on Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs,
21 November 2017, paras 44–5 and 48–9.
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In relation to rehabilitation, the Court ordered Colombia, as in cases before
Génesis, to provide victims with free, adequate, and priority mental and
physical health treatment, if they consented to it, for as long as needed.
However, the Court added a caveat indicating that ‘the State could provide
such treatment through its national health services, including the PAPSIVI as
far as it complies with what the Court has ordered’.165 The PAPSIVI is the
national Health and Psychosocial Programme for Victims (Programa de
Atención Psicosocial y Salud integral a vı́ctimas). Thus the Court allowed
Colombia to provide rehabilitation through healthcare services under its
own domestic reparation programme and hence, while the order shows
more restraint than Génesis, the door remained open to the State to decide
to use its own programme to provide rehabilitation to victims, even if the
Court qualified the terms of such services.
In contrast to rehabilitation, Yarce appears to mark a departure fromGénesis
on compensation, because the Court awarded compensation for material and
non-material damages to victims based on equity. What caused the shift?
While the position upheld by the Court in Yarce is different from that in
Génesis, it cannot be taken to be a change of jurisprudence since the decision
was based on the fact that the legal representatives of the victims presented
their evidence on reparations outside the legal deadline given by the Court
and Colombia did not present precise information to the Court about com-
pensation for victims in the case through its domestic reparation
programme.166 Thus the Court had to adjudicate using its own jurisprudence
and the equity principle. The Court awarded both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages to the victims and their next of kin167 – although, arguably,
the amounts given as compensation are lower than those awarded in similar
cases.168
Given that Yarce was a case about women human rights defenders, the
Commission and the victims requested guarantees of non-repetition.169
Colombia presented information on measures taken, but the Court was not
satisfied with the information received and noted, once again, that it needed
specific information about guarantees of non-repetition in the specific case. As
a result, the Court ordered the creation of a programme, course, or training on
the work of human rights defenders to be given to people in comuna 13.170
165 IACtHR, Yarce (n. 158), para. 340.
166 Ibid., para. 362.
167 Ibid., paras 363–7.
168 Ibid., paras 363–70.
169 Ibid., paras 346–7.
170 Ibid., para. 350.
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Another important case decided against Colombia in which its domestic
reparation programme was at stake is Vereda La Esperanza.171 It dealt with the
enforced disappearance of various persons, including three children, as well as
the killing of another person in the village of that name.172 The case embraces
qualified deference as in Yarce and provides important reasoning on subsidi-
arity at the reparations stage.
The Court dedicated various paragraphs to justify its shift in jurisprudence
with respect to Génesis by resorting to subsidiarity. As already mentioned,
while the ACHR refers to complementarity, that concept corresponds to that
of subsidiarity as defined in this chapter. The Court used the preamble to the
ACHR to indicate that ‘the Convention system does not substitute national
jurisdictions but complements them’.173 This means that the State is the one
called to act upon its international obligations, including on reparation, before
the State has to respond before any international mechanism.174 However, if
a case reaches the Court, it is not sufficient for the State to allege that it has
remedies in place or that it has provided reparation; rather, in such a situation,
‘it needs to be assessed if [the State] effectively provided reparation of the
consequences of the violations in a specific case, if reparations are adequate, or
that there is a guaranty that domestic reparation mechanisms are sufficient’.175
On rehabilitation, the Court followed Yarce and repeated, verbatim, the
order on rehabilitation, which, if provided according to the standards of the
Court, could be provided by the PAPSIVI.176
In terms of compensation, the majority of the victims received reparation
for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages by means of the contentious
administrative judicial system in Colombia. There was evidence of the pay-
ments made and clarity about who had not received compensation domestic-
ally. As a consequence, the Court considered that the amounts paid for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages were reasonable.177 However, the
Court complemented said payments in relation to those victims who had
not received compensation by the national judiciary, awarding the same
amount of money that other victims had received for the same reason from
national courts. It further noted that the direct victims of enforced
171 IACtHR,Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections,Merits, Reparations and
Costs, 31 August 2017.
172 Ibid., para. 77.
173 Ibid., para. 260.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., para. 263 (translation by the author).
176 Ibid., para. 278.
177 Ibid., paras 303–5 and 308–9.
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disappearance also endured moral damage and that this should be
compensated – something not supported by domestic jurisprudence – and it
awarded compensation for this reason.178
The victims and the Commission requested that the Court order collective
reparation. The State argued that the community had been given priority for
collective reparation in Antioquia as part of the domestic reparation programme,
and that dialogue between the State and the community was ongoing.179 The
Court did not order collective reparation given that there were important domes-
tic efforts to that end.180 This is the only form of reparation in Vereda La
Esperanza in which the Court exercised unqualified deference to Colombia.
Yarce and Vereda La Esperanza illustrate the Court’s ability to revisit its
approach to subsidiarity when it lacks concluding evidence that Colombia’s
domestic reparation programme has or would provide victims before the
Court with integral reparation. Indeed, as rightly pointed out by one of the
senior lawyers at the Inter-American Court, all of these cases show ‘a Court
trying to understand what was in place in Colombia in forms of reparation’.181
There was, however, another concern present during this process at the Court:
how to take into account what States do to comply with human rights obliga-
tions. Indeed, the same lawyer indicated that, ‘at the same time that the Inter-
American System has evolved, domestic mechanisms in various countries
have also done so. Then, the Court, and it is true that this did not happen at
the beginning, takes more into account what the State has done.’182 Another
senior lawyer at the Court reiterated that:
[T]he Court has to have some deference to States that really adopt human
rights standards, that adopt policies that are, in principle, in accordance with
human rights. What the Inter-American System has done during years is to
say to the States: You have to do this, you have to ensure human rights, you
have to have policies, you have to provide reparation to victims . . .OK.When
States begin to react, begin to adopt policies, you cannot be indifferent to
that, . . . for example, . . . Colombia has a very ambitious reparation law.
I believe that it would not be an attitude, beyond what is legal, not even
ethical, to say ‘well, we will do as if nothing was in place.’183
178 Ibid., paras 311–12.
179 Ibid., paras 288–90.
180 Ibid., para. 291.
181 Interview IACtHR10, 13 February 2018, conducted as part of the Human Rights Law
Implementation Project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
182 Ibid.
183 Interview IACtHR15, 15 February 2018, conducted as part of the Human Rights Law
Implementation Project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
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Importantly, Yarce and Vereda La Esperanza do not deal with hundreds of
internally displaced victims as does Génesis, making the cases different in
nature and therefore different in terms of the impact that the judgment of the
Court could have in Colombia as a result of the change of case law. But these
judgments also show that, even if that deference is now more qualified than it
was in Génesis, the Court still considers it important to defer to Colombia on
how best to repair victims in relation to certain issues such as rehabilitation or
collective reparation.
At time of writing, the case of the Patriotic Union is pending at the Court.
This case will test the position of the Court on domestic reparation pro-
grammes and subsidiarity.
D. The Reasoning of the Court behind Deference in Relation to Domestic
Reparation Programmes: Problems and Consequences
The cases of Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru illustrate the changing approach
that the Court has taken to reparations in recent years and the increasing
attention that it is giving to subsidiarity on reparations. However, the legal
reasoning behind the Court’s departures from its constant jurisprudence on
reparation needs to be scrutinised. How is the Court justifying its approach?
What is the impact of the Court’s approach to the right to reparation for victims
of armed conflict? What role should subsidiarity play when international courts
adjudicate on reparation? Basically, as Paolo Carozza indicates, ‘subsidiarity
cannot be reduced to a simple devolution of authority to more local levels’.184
Supranational bodies called to adjudicate on reparation in relation to victims of
armed conflict must provide careful legal analysis for the decisions they reach,
including on subsidiarity, as well as an adequate assessment of evidence. This
burden is heightened when what is at stake is the authority and legitimacy of
a court such as the IACtHR, which, through adjudication on human rights
violations, has also crafted a ground-breaking body of jurisprudence, in terms of
both substantive and procedural principles, which has gained international
recognition and is considered to be the jurisprudence to reckon with, even
outside of the Americas region. So the jurisprudence of this Court on reparation
is called upon to impact beyond the Inter-American System.
The Court has, to date, provided some reasons to justify deference in
relation to domestic reparation programmes. The starting point for the
Court has been context: the recognition that transitional justice experiences
impose an enormous burden on States, particularly those moving away from
184 Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle’ (n. 10), 79.
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armed conflict into peace, to comply with various international obligations,
including, but not limited to, providing truth, justice, reparation, and guaran-
tees of non-recurrence. The Court is mindful of the challenging circum-
stances in which reparation takes place: a very difficult political context in
which the financial, human, and institutional resources to implement repar-
ation are limited.
Additionally, the Court has acknowledged that domestic reparation pro-
grammes are a legitimate tool to provide reparation for victims in such
contexts. In Génesis, the Court stated that:
[I]n scenarios of transitional justice in which States must assume their
obligations to make reparation on a massive scale to numerous victims,
which significantly exceeds the capacities and possibilities of the domes-
tic courts, administrative programs of reparation constitute one of the
legitimate ways of satisfying the right to reparation. In these circum-
stances, such measures of reparation must be understood in conjunction
with other measures of truth and justice, provided that they meet a series
of related requirements, including their legitimacy – especially, based on
the consultation with and participation of the victims; their adoption in
good faith; the degree of social inclusion they allow; the reasonableness
and proportionality of the pecuniary measures; the type of reasons given
to provide reparations by family group and not individually; the distribu-
tion criteria among members of a family (succession order or percent-
ages); parameters for a fair distribution that take into account the
position of the women among the members of the family or other
differentiated aspects, such as whether the land and other means of
production are owned collectively.185
The position of the Court is not that all domestic reparation programmes will
always be adequate to provide reparation, but that they might be if they
comply with various requirements such as the proportionality and reasonable-
ness of compensation, the criteria adopted for victims’ eligibility and consult-
ation. However, such criteria, while important, have not been explained or
applied to the specific facts of the cases in Génesis, Yarce, or Vereda La
Esperanza, or in any of the other cases dealing with domestic reparation
programmes. This is particularly problematic because States and victims
need to understand the criteria and arguments of the Court even if they
disagree with the Court’s views.
The criteria and their applicationmust also be clear to relevant stakeholders
where the scope and reach of the right to reparation of victims of armed
185 IACtHR, Génesis (n. 106), para. 470.
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conflict is involved. Under current international human rights law and inter-
national lawmore broadly speaking, precise answers are needed. For example,
when the Court refers to consultation of victims and social inclusion, what is it
actually saying? When would victims need to be consulted? What kind of
consultation would fulfil the standards of the Court? Is it consultation about
the process, or about the forms of reparation to be given to victims, or about
who should be eligible and for what violations? In relation to compensation,
how does the Court understand what is proportional and reasonable when it
comes down to providing monetary reparation for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages? Could States award less compensation than that awarded
by the Court when adjudicating in individual cases? If so, why? Could States
legitimately argue that they do not have the financial means to provide
reparation following the standards of the Court, so that, for instance,
Colombia and Guatemala could provide different amounts of money to
compensate cases of enforced disappearances through their domestic repar-
ation programmes? From an evidentiary point of view, what kind of evidence
would the Court need to be able to decide what is reasonable and proportional
in the circumstances? Or to assess whether adequate consultation took place
and/or women were allowed a tangible role? Is it evidence related to the
specific victims in the case or about the overall performance of the domestic
reparation programme, or both?
All that is evident from the qualified deference approach developed by the
Court is that it is revisiting its approach to reparation regarding domestic
reparation programmes when it sees that States, in good faith, are taking
measures to provide reparation to victims.
E. The Court’s Shift towards Subsidiarity: What Explains This Approach?
The previous section has carefully analysed the changes in the jurisprudence
of the Court in relation to reparation for victims of gross human rights
violations that took place in armed conflict. It has concluded that the Court
has indeed changed in nuanced ways its constant jurisprudence on reparation
and is giving more room to States on reparation – a phenomenon I am
referring to as ‘qualified deference’. This analysis contrasts with that of those
who believe ‘considerations of subsidiarity play a fairly small role in the
IACtHR’s remedial practice’,186 that ‘the Inter-American Court embraces
a maximalist model of adjudication – one that leaves very little, if any, room
186 Newman, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n. 11), 373.
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for states to reach their own decisions’187 and/or that ‘the Court’s intrusive
approach to remedies cannot be seen in isolation from its resistance to
a margin of appreciation’.188 Four possible reasons explain this shift: the
political context in the region; the perceived nature of the human rights
violations taking place in the region; the nature of the litigation taking place
before the Inter-American Court; and the belief that subsidiarity on repar-
ations, particularly domestic reparation programmes, could enhance
implementation.
1. The Political Context in the Region
The first factor, the political context, refers to the worldwide political land-
scape, particularly that of the Americas region, where the Court must adjudi-
cate on human rights. While human rights law has, to a certain extent, been
able to evolve and consolidate despite the many challenges it faces, a new and
hard backlash has unleashed against this body of law and its international
institutions – one that is having an impact on the way in which they can
respond to human rights violations. The situation is palpable in the Americas
region.
The political systems in various States in which autocracies have gained
power, such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras, and in which right-wing
governments have risen to power, as in the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil, have
had an impact on the Inter-American System and will continue to impact its
work.189 This was very visible in the complaint by various States in the region
arguing that the Commission and the Court were exceeding their mandates.
Indeed, during the so-called strengthening process of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, which took place between 2011 and 2013,190
the Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Working of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights with a view to Strengthening
the Inter-American Human Rights System, in December 2011, stated that ‘the
187 Jorge Contesse, ‘Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System’,
Law and Contemporary Problems 79 (2016), 123–45 (124).
188 Başak Çalı, ‘Explaining Variation in the Intrusiveness of Regional Human Rights Remedies
in Domestic Orders’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 16 (2018), 214–34 (231).
189 Ximena Soley and Silvia Steininger, ‘Parting Ways or Lashing back? Withdrawals, Backlash
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, International Journal of Law in Context 14
(2018), 237–57 (241). See also Par Engstrom, ‘Introduction: Rethinking the Impact of the Inter-
American Human Rights System’, in Par Engstrom (ed.), The Inter-American Human Rights
System: Impact beyond Compliance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 1–22 (16).
190 DPLF, ‘The Reform of the Inter-AmericanCommission of HumanRights’,Aportes, 19 (2014),
available at www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/aportes_19_english.pdf.
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promotion and protection of human rights in the Hemisphere is primarily the
responsibility of the member states, emphasizing the complementary or sup-
plementary role of the IAHRS [Inter-American Human Rights System]’.191
Equally, Venezuela denounced the ACHR in 2012, arguing that both the
Commission and the Court were acting against their mandates. For instance,
in a letter to the Organization of American States’ Secretary-General,
Venezuela stated that ‘both the Inter-American Commission as well as the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have gone beyond the sacred prin-
ciples [of the Convention], becoming politicised institutions aiming to desta-
bilise certain governments, particularly ours, intervening in the internal affairs
of our government, breaching basic and essential principles fully recognised
in international law such as state sovereignty’.192 The letter added, referring to
the Court, that ‘[it] cannot pretend to exclude, dismiss or substitute the
constitutional legal order of the States party, because its jurisdiction is com-
plementary to that of the States at the domestic level’.193
To these challenges should be added the scandal in Costa Rica in
February 2018, as a result of the publication by the Court of Advisory
Opinion 24 on Gender Identity, and Equality and non-Discrimination with
Regard to Same-Sex Couples. In response, Costa Rica, one of the principal
supporters of the Inter-American System, threatened to denounce the
American Convention.194 All of this has called into question the legitimacy
of the system and has triggered more caution on the judicial activism of the
Court.
2. Changes in the Types of Human Rights Violation Taking Place
in the Region, Coupled with the Idea that Democracy Has Taken Hold
in OAS Member States
Another key factor to explain the change in approach is the growing belief in
the region that gross systematic human rights violations, dictatorships, and
191 Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Special Working Group to
Reflect on theWorkings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a View to
Strengthening the IAHRS, OEA/Ser.GGT/SIDH-13/11 rev.2, 13 December 2011, para. 2.
192 Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the OAS
Secretary-General, 6 September 2012, 2, available at www.minci.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/
2013/09/Carta-Retiro-CIDH-Firmada-y-sello.pdf.
193 Ibid., 3–4.
194 Elena Abrusci, ‘The IACtHR Advisory Opinion: One Step forward or Two Steps back for
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conflicts are a matter of the past and that other human rights problems are
relevant today. While it is undeniable that the nature of human rights viola-
tions is changing, and that new and serious challenges are emerging that need
to be addressed, from LGBTQ+ rights to human rights and mega projects, it is
also the case that violations from the past remain present, from enforced
disappearances to torture and unlawful killings. Justice for violations of the
past remains an unfinished business.
However, while new human rights violations are taking place that demand
new responses and strategies at both the domestic and international levels, it is
also the case that while the majority of States in the region are, in theory,
democracies, they remain very fragile and impunity continues to be rampant.
The consequence of the belief that democracy has taken hold is that the
system is more likely to operate under deference to the domestic level, given
that it believes that rule of law and democracy are present and therefore that
human rights can be better protected. As Par Engstrom suggests, ‘the formal
democratic credentials of governments have made the balancing act for the
IAHRS, between its role as a supranational human rights arbiter on the one
hand, and the principle and practice of subsidiarity on the other, increasingly
delicate’.195
3. Subsidiarity Could Enhance Implementation
The belief that subsidiarity on reparation in countries undergoing transitions,
particularly those moving away from conflict, could enhance implementation
is also present in the Court’s reasoning towards deference, even if the Court
has not articulated this position more explicitly.196 Problems of implementa-
tion are not new in international law generally and particularly in inter-
national human rights law. As De Vos and Baluarte stated in 2010, ‘an
implementation crisis currently afflicts the regional and international legal
bodies charged with protecting human rights’,197 and compliance with reports
of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights or judgments of the
IACtHR are no exception to this crisis. Indeed, up to the last annual report
published by the Court in 2019, 223 cases were pending full compliance,
which entails monitoring implementation of 11,153 different forms of
195 Engstrom, ‘Introduction’ (n. 189), 16.
196 See the concurring opinion by former judge Diego Garcia-Sayán in IACtHR,Cepeda Vargas
(n. 133).
197 Christian de Vos and David C. Baluarte, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing
International and Regional Human Rights Decisions (New York: Open Society Justice
Initiative, 2010), 11.
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reparation. This number should be a cause for alarm because the vast majority
of these cases concern gross human rights violations that took place in times of
armed conflict or dictatorship.198
Judgments on reparation for victims of armed conflict are perceived to be
a burden by the States charged with implementing them – a perception that
impacts negatively on overall levels of implementation. Indeed, the Court’s
orders are seen as generating a high financial burden on States not only
because of Court orders of compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages, but also because of the financial costs of implementing other
measures, such as rehabilitation or development projects. From an institu-
tional point of view, States undergoing a transition have only weak institutions,
making it challenging to put in place all that is required to effectively imple-
ment the orders of the Court.199 Equally, some orders are seen as politically
problematic because they aim to provide reparation to victims who are seen to
be undeserving of reparation, perhaps because they were combatants or had
a leftist ideology, or because those behind the violations are very powerful
perpetrators.200 Finally, the orders are also seen as creating precedents for
other victims who would like to be redressed on the same terms specified by
the Court, all at a time when the State is trying to deal with the legacy of mass
atrocities in its own way and with thousands, if not millions, of victims.
The Inter-American Court, like any other international or supranational
body, aims to be an effective mechanism to protect human rights. To this end,
it should have the ‘basic ability to compel or cajole compliance with its
judgments’.201 In this context, in which the Court is looking for tools to trigger
implementation, subsidiarity appears as an option, particularly in relation to
States, such as Colombia, in which steps have been taken to comply with
human rights obligations.
4. A Change in the Nature of the Litigation before the System
Before the turn of the century, the Inter-American Court did not have to take
into account domestic reparation programmes to order reparations in individ-
ual cases for two reasons. First, the right to reparation gained prominence in
198 IACtHR, Annual Report 2019, 61.
199 Lars Waldorf, ‘Institutional Gardening in Unsettled Times: Transitional Justice and
Institutional Contexts’, in Roger Duttie and Paul Seils (eds), Justice Mosaics: How Context
Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies (New York: ICTJ, 2017), 40–83 (42 and 45).
200 IACtHR, Bámaca Velázquez v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, 22 February 2002.
201 Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication’, Yale Law Journal 107 (1997) 273–391 (278).
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international legal discourse and litigation only in the 2000s.202 As
a consequence, for many years, litigants working before the Inter-American
System had focused their attention on the merits of the litigation, but not on
the potential ways in which harm caused to victims could be repaired or on
whether implementation of orders was actually taking place. The Court itself,
with its ground-breaking jurisprudence on reparation, helped States and
litigants to better articulate their arguments on the subject. Second, the first
domestic reparation programmes to be established in the Americas regions
were in States moving away from dictatorship and into democracy, as was
the case in Argentina and Chile, aiming to redress the gross human rights
violations that took place when the Court did not have jurisdiction over
such atrocities.203
The landscape of adjudication on reparation and domestic reparation
programmes began to change as transitional justice – alongside transition to
democracy – made its way into various countries in the region already moving
away from armed conflict situations, such as in Guatemala, Peru, or
Colombia. Importantly, States were the first to argue before the Court that it
should award reparation in line with those ordered by their domestic repar-
ation programmes. Nevertheless, the Court did not entertain such arguments.
For example, in Castro Castro Prison v. Peru,204 the State argued that, given
the significant amount of money it was paying to comply with judgments of
the Court and friendly settlements of the Commission, the Court should order
‘that the reparations consequence of the international responsibility of the
State be fixed by the State through its reparatory policies’.205 Indeed, as Julie
Guillerot and Lisa Magarrell show, if Peru had to provide reparation to the
23,969 killed or disappeared victims (according to the Peruvian TRC) apply-
ing the same standards of the Inter-American Court, the State would have to
pay approximately 4.4 billion USD instead of the 771.7 million USD that the
Peruvian government envisaged as the cost of compensation in its domestic
202 For the historical development and the turn from state-centred to victim-centred reparation,
see Furuya, ‘Right to Reparation’, Chapter 1 in this volume, sections II and III.
203 For example, the domestic reparation programme in Argentina was the result of various laws
that were sanctioned by National Congress starting in 1991. See Maria Jose Guembe,
‘Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: The Argentinian Experience’,
in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 21–54 (31–44).
204 IACtHR, Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 25 November 2006.
205 Final Pleadings of the State of Peru in Castro Castro Prison, presented by Oscar Ayzanoa
Vigil, State agent, 3 August 2006, 13, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/expedientes/
alefi_est.pdf.
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reparation programme.206 It is probable that the Court dismissed the argu-
ment because the law creating the domestic reparation programme had been
adopted in Peru only recently.207 The Commission and the common inter-
vener in the case did not refer in their pleadings to Peru’s domestic reparation
programme, probably because of the belief that, once a case reaches the
Court, the supranational body is the one mandated to order reparation.208
As the litigation of the cases concerning gross human rights violations have
begun to change, as noted in section III.B of this chapter, domestic reparation
programmes have become an area of litigation before the system and, in this
context, the discussion of subsidiarity has emerged. The Court has had no
choice but to address the issues put forward for adjudication.209
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE ON REPARATION
A. The Court’s Standard Approach to Subsidiarity and Reparation
The approach to subsidiarity of the Inter-American Court stands in stark
contrast with that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where
the subsidiarity principle has been so fundamental that even specific concepts
such as the ‘margin of appreciation’ have been crafted to defer to States
important decisions in relation to how to comply with human rights law.210
In the words of the former president of the ECtHR, Judge Spielmann, ‘[t]he
judgments which refer to the subsidiary role of the Convention mechanism
are very old, since the Court referred to that concept as early as 1968 in the
Belgian Linguistic case. Since then the principle has been reaffirmed many
times, to the point where it has become one of the keystones of our system.’211
206 Julie Guillerot and Lisa Magarrell, Memorias de un Proceso Inacabado (Lima: ICTJ/
Aprodeh, 2006), 131.
207 IACtHR, Castro Castro Prison (n. 204), para. 412.
208 Ibid., paras 410–11.
209 Sandoval, ‘Two Steps forward, One Step back’ (n. 138), 1192–208.
210 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2002);
George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’, Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 26 (2006), 705–32.
211 ECtHR, President Dean Spielmann, Seminar Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?, Opening
Speech, 30 January 2014, 2, available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_S
eminar_2015_ENG.pdf, referring to ECHR, Belgium Linguistics, Judgment of 23 July 1968,
App. Nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64.
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Subsidiarity is not only prominent in the jurisprudence of the Court, as
noted in the coming pages, but also a foundational principle of the Council of
Europe’s institutional and normative design. As explained by Harris and
colleagues, ‘the original purpose of the Convention was not primarily to
offer a remedy for particular individuals who had suffered violations of the
Convention but to provide a collective interstate guarantee that would benefit
individuals generally by requiring the national law of the contracting parties to
be kept within certain bounds’.212
In harmony with this foundational idea, Article 41 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) establishes that ‘if the Court finds
that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and
if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party’.
In line with Article 41, as Hawking and Jacoby explain, ‘the ECtHR exer-
cises what [can be called] “delegative compliance”, whereby its rulings will
identify a violation, but not make orders on how to end the violation, compen-
sate for its effects, or prevent future infringement’.213 From this point of view,
a judgment of the European Court is merely declaratory because, in principle,
‘the Court does not tell states how to remedy any violations that it finds’.214
Under this approach, the ECtHR defers to States how to redress human rights
violations, even if the Committee of Ministers is able to monitor compliance
with judgments. Even in 1998, the ECtHR held that:
[A] judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State
a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its
consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation
existing before the breach (restitutio in integrum). However, if restitutio in
integrum is in practice impossible, the respondent States are free to choose
the means whereby they comply with a judgment in which the Court has
found a breach, and the Court will not make consequential orders or declara-
tory statements in this regard. It falls to the Committee of Ministers of the
212 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, and Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2014), 37.
213 Darren Hawkings and Wade Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European
and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’, Journal of International Law and International
Relations 6 (2010–11), 35–85 (37).
214 Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’, 12 July 2000, Doc.8808, para. 2,
available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?
FileID=9013&lang=en.
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Council of Europe, acting under Article 54 of the Convention, to supervise
compliance in this respect.215
As a general rule, the ECtHR has treated compensation as a form of just
satisfaction. It awards compensation ‘solely for damage suffered by those
concerned to the extent that such events constitute a consequence of the
violation that cannot otherwise be remedied’,216 and, even then, only if neces-
sary. Thus the Court does not always award compensation. The Court also
considers the judgment itself to be a form of just satisfaction.217
In relation to widespread and systematic human rights violations in times of
armed conflict or repression, such as killings, torture, enforced disappear-
ances, or property loss, the Court has often awarded compensation, at least
for non-pecuniary damages, as a form of just satisfaction. In Isayeva, Yusupova
and Bazayeva v. Russia,218 a case concerning the bombing of a convoy of
civilian cars leaving Grozny (Chechnya) in 1999 and the subsequent lack of
investigation with due diligence, the Court found that Russia violated the right
to life of the three applicants and of two children because it failed to protect
the lives of the victims.219 It also found a failure to investigate with due
diligence and a violation to property rights of one of the applicants because
three of her cars were destroyed during the bombardment.220 The Court
awarded 12,000 EUR as pecuniary damages for the loss of the applicant’s
cars,221 based on equity and non-pecuniary damages in the amounts requested
by the three applicants: 25,000 EUR, 15,000 EUR and 5,000 EUR,
respectively.222
Similarly, in Timurtas v. Turkey,223 a case concerning the enforced dis-
appearance of the applicant’s son, who had been detained by authorities in
south-east Turkey,224 the Court found that Turkey was responsible for his
death after his unacknowledged detention,225 that there had been a failure to
215 ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 April 1998, Application Nos 12/1997/
796/998–999, para. 125.
216 ECtHR, Scozzari andGiunta v. Italy, GrandChamber, Judgment of 13 July 2000, Application
Nos 39221/98 and 41963/98, para. 250.
217 ECtHR,Hanif v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 20December 2011, ApplicationNos 52999/08
and 61779/08, para. 155.
218 ECtHR, Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 February 2005,
Application Nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, paras 11–42.
219 Ibid., para. 199.
220 Ibid., paras 225 and 230–4.
221 Ibid., para. 246.
222 Ibid., para. 252.
223 ECtHR, Timurtas v. Turkey, Judgment of 13 June 2000, Application No. 23531/94.
224 Ibid., paras 10–22.
225 Ibid., paras 86 and 106.
224 Clara Sandoval
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/23753176/WORKINGFOLDER/CORREA-RG/9781108480956C03.3D 225 [179–264] 22.8.2020
10:15AM
investigate with due diligence, and that the father of the applicant had suffered
inhuman treatment as a result of the disappearance of his son.226 The Court
awarded 20,000GBP in favour of the disappeared son and 10,000GBP for the
father of the applicant, both as non-pecuniary damages.227
Even in cases concerning the extraterritorial application of the ECHR
for violations of procedural obligations in times of armed conflict, the
Court has also awarded compensation. An important example is Al-Skeini
and Others v. United Kingdom,228 in which the Grand Chamber was asked
to exercise jurisdiction over the procedural obligation under Article 2
ECHR, as a result of the lack of an effective investigation into the deaths
of various relatives of the applicants who died while under the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom in Iraq. The Grand Chamber considered that it
was reasonable to ‘compensate each of the first five applicants for the
distress caused by the lack of a fully independent investigation into the
deaths of their relatives’ and awarded 17,000 EUR per applicant for non-
pecuniary damages.229 It must be noted that while the extraterritorial
application of the Convention was at the heart of the litigation in
the case, the issue did not turn on the reparation arguments presented
by the parties.
While the ECtHR does not use a flexible concept of victim when awarding
reparation as the IACtHR does, the ECtHR recognises that, in cases concern-
ing gross human rights violations, particularly those involving killings or
disappearances, some members of the family, such as the parents or the
children of the direct victim, can also be victims of violations of the ECHR,
for example under Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture, inhuman, or
degrading treatment). By way of illustration, in Timurtas, the father of the
victim was awarded non-pecuniary damages for the suffering he underwent as
a result of the disappearance of his son and the conduct of State authorities in
the search of his son.230
While the Court has awarded compensation in relation to the nature of the
violations at stake and the lack of effective investigations of gross human rights
violations in times of armed conflict, subsidiarity remains present in these
decisions. Indeed, when awarding compensation according to its own Practice
226 Ibid., para. 98.
227 Ibid., paras 125–8.
228 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 7 July 2011,
Application No. 55721/07, paras 3 and 161–77.
229 Ibid., para. 182.
230 ECtHR, Timurtas (n. 223), paras 125–8.
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Directions, ‘the Court will normally take into account the local economic
circumstances’ and could ‘take guidance from domestic standards’.231
Furthermore, the Court can take into account subsidiarity, beyond com-
pensation. In Al-Skeini, the applicants asked theCourt to order a due diligence
investigation into the deaths of their relatives.232 The Court used its standard
formula to note that:
[T]he respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will
discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided
that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s
judgment. Consequently, it considers that in these applications it falls to the
Committee of Ministers acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address
the issues as to what may be required in practical terms by way of
compliance.233
This leads to discussion of a second provision in the European Convention –
one of paramount importance when considering the execution of judgments
handed down by the Court: Article 46. This provision states that States party to
the ECHR ‘undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case
to which they are parties’. The provision also establishes the powers of the
Committee of Ministers as the body responsible for supervising the execution
of judgments. Furthermore, the Article establishes the various tools available
to the Committee of Ministers to address issues of interpretation of the
judgments that may be problematic for their execution or how to deal with
States that refuse to execute judgments. In recent years, the Court has used this
provision to broaden the individual or general measures it orders in relation to
certain cases.234
B. Changes in the Court’s Treatment of Subsidiarity and Reparation
While the principle of subsidiarity remains strongly embedded in the ethos of
the Council of Europe, the nature and the scale of certain violations, as well as
implementation challenges, have triggered a more nuanced approach by the
Court to reparations and to subsidiarity. This is well illustrated by pilot and
231 ECtHR, Practice Direction, Just Satisfaction Claims, 28March 2007, available at https://echr
.coe.int/Documents/PD_satisfaction_claims_ENG.pdf.
232 ECtHR, Al-Skeini (n. 228), para. 179.
233 Ibid., para. 181.
234 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, ‘The Involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Implementation of Its Judgments: Recent Developments under Article 46 ECHR’,
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 32 (2014), 235–62.
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semi-pilot judgments, as well as by inter-State complaints, as this chapter now
proceeds to show.
1. The Pilot Judgment Procedure
With the growing expansion of the Council of Europe and the many cases
arriving at Strasbourg, the ECtHR faces the challenge of how to adjudicate on
human rights violations in a changing landscape. As a consequence of the
large and systematic violations, gross or not, that are reaching the Court, the
pilot judgment procedure has been one of its answers in relation to repetitive
cases that indicate a systemic problem in a State. Repetitive cases can be
defined as to ‘two-thirds of the admissible complaints’.235
The Court has indeed received many cases in which the roots of the human
rights violations are the same. In such situations, the Court may decide to
follow the pilot judgment procedure; as a consequence, it may identify the
structural problem and deliver its views to the State in question about the types
of general remedy it should adopt. Such views are expressed also in the
operative paragraphs of the judgment. The Court does not resolve each single
case; rather, by deciding one or a few of the cases, it expects the State to resolve
the underlying problem of all ‘repeated cases’.236 Pilot judgments have dealt
with, for example, land restitution,237 excessive length of proceedings238 and
inadequate conditions of detention.239
Importantly, pilot judgments are a step towards increasing intrusion into
States’ prerogative.240 The Court, with the blessing of the Committee of
Ministers, gives less deference to States and exercises less judicial restraint,
instead providing guidance in its judgment on the general measures that the
States should adopt. Indeed, as Fyrnys states, ‘by issuing a substantively pro-
grammed lawmaking obligation pilot judgments impose the legal arguments
235 Markus Fyrnys, ‘Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment
Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, German Law Journal 12 (2011), 1231–60
(1233).
236 ECtHR, Factsheet: Pilot Judgments, February 2018, 1, available at https://echr.coe.int/Doc
uments/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf. See also Lize Glas, ‘The Functioning of the
Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights in Practice’,
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 34 (2016), 41–70 (42–5).
237 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, Judgment of 22 June 2004, Application No. 31443/96.
238 ECtHR, Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, Judgment of 7 July 2015, Application Nos 72287/10,
13927/11 and 46187/11.
239 ECtHR, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 10 January 2012, Application Nos 42525/
07 and 60800/08.
240 Çalı, ‘Explaining Variation’ (n. 188), 223–4.
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on the political process at the supervisory level. This form of judicialization of
the political mechanisms of supervision restricts the Committee of Ministers’
competence to supervise the implementation of judgments.’241 However, as
Başak Çalı highlights, intrusion in the form of pilot judgments is ‘negotiated’:
the Court first consults the respective State to see if it agrees to a pilot
judgment. Furthermore, the pilot judgment is not fully prescriptive, but rather
constitutes an important guide to what States could do to resolve the systemic
problem identified by the Court. Unlike the IACtHR, the ECtHR does not
prescribe the form of reparation but gives a certain margin of choice to
States.242 This means that an important balancing exercise takes place at the
Court between its judicial authority to address reparation and the principle of
subsidiarity. In this balancing exercise, subsidiarity is not sacrificed, but it is
certainly more limited than when the Court deals with other types of case.
Dilek Kurban has noted an important feature of pilot judgments in that they
were put in place by people who ‘had in mind cases raising transitional justice
issues that Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) should have
“dealt with” before they ratified the European Convention on Human
Rights’.243 For Antoine Buyse, ‘[i]ssues ranging from the implementation of
judgments to large-scale restitution and compensation schemes for properties
nationalised in the communist era all surfaced. This partially changed the role
of the Strasbourg Court from fine-tuning the situation in relatively stable and
functioning societies to having to deal with large-scale and systemic human
rights problems.’244 Kurban’s statement is correct. States transitioning from
one political and economic system to another in Europe triggered important
responses from the ECtHR. However, while the great majority of pilot judg-
ments have been used in relation to such States, they have also been used in
relation to well-established democracies and long-term members of the
Council of Europe, such as Germany or the United Kingdom.245 Still, it
must be noted that less deference tends to be given by the Court to States
where systemic problems are at stake. Çalı explains this differential approach
of the Court when looking at substantive violations by arguing that the Court
241 Fyrnys, ‘Expanding Competences’ (n. 235), 1250.
242 Glas, ‘The Functioning of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure’ (n. 236), 51–5.
243 Dilek Kurban, ‘Forsaking Individual Justice: The Implications of the European Court of
Human Rights’ Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations’,
Human Rights Law Review 16 (2016), 731–69 (735).
244 Antoine Buyse, ‘The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights:
Possibilities and Challenges’, Law of Ukraine (2013), 303–17 (313).
245 ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, Judgment of 2 September 2010, Application No. 46344/06;
ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 November 2010, Application
Nos 60041/08 and 60054/08.
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grants more deference – a margin of appreciation – to those ‘who the Court
deems to be good faith interpreters and thus guardians of the Convention’.246
While Çalı is looking at substantive violations, her reasoning could also be
applied to pilot judgments: the Court becomes more intrusive into systemic
problems and how they should be addressed where a State, having been given
the opportunity to rectify a problem, has failed to take the necessary measures
to respond to the situation. However, this does not apply to an overwhelming
amount of cases against particular States, because the Court appears to be
mindful of ‘whether specificity/or prescriptiveness will indeed aid
implementation’.247
The procedure of pilot judgments began in 2004, when the Committee of
Ministers invited the Court to deal with repetitive cases by identifying the
‘underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in particular
when it is likely to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist states in
finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervis-
ing the execution of judgments’.248
The very first case of this nature was Broniowski v. Poland, concerning
Poland’s refusal to compensate a Polish man whose family was forced to
leave his property near the Bug River and move to western Poland during
World War II.249 This case deals with large-scale violations of the right to
property. According to the Court, this was not an isolated case but rather ‘the
consequence of administrative and regulatory conduct on the part of the
authorities towards an identifiable class of citizens, namely the Bug River
claimants’,250 that was affecting approximately 80,000 people.251 At the time
of the judgment, there were 189 similar cases pending decision at the Court
and many more were expected.252
In its decision, the Court went beyond compensation and referred to
‘general measures’. This is a prerogative that the Court has under Article
46 ECHR to ensure that States ‘adopt measures to prevent repetitive
246 Başak Çali, ‘Coping with Crisis: Whither the Variable Geometry in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights’, Wisconsin International Law Journal 35 (2018),
237–76 (243).
247 Alice Donald and Anne-Katrin Speck, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Remedial
Practice and Its Impact on the Execution of Judgments’,Human Rights Law Review 19 (2019),
1–35 (10).
248 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution Res(2004) 3, on judgments
revealing an underlying systemic problem, 12 May 2004, I.
249 ECtHR, Broniowski (n. 237), paras 13–38.
250 Ibid., para. 189.
251 Ibid., para. 193.
252 Ibid.
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cases’.253 What the Court calls general measures is equivalent to guaran-
tees of non-repetition under both public international law254 and inter-
national human rights law.255 These are measures of reparation ordered to
ensure that the violations that took place do not happen again and they are
intended to have a systemic reach. Importantly, they aim to protect
persons other than the victims in the case from suffering similar harm as
a result of the same violations, but they also have a reparatory impact on
victims in the specific case. The views of the Court were to apply not only
to the individual applicant in the case, but also to all other victims in the
same situation.256 The Court stated:
Although it is in principle not for the Court to determine what remedial
measures may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent State’s obligations
under Article 46 of the Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it
has identified, the Court would observe that general measures at national
level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the present judgment,
measures which must take into account the many people affected. Above
all, the measures adopted must be such as to remedy the systemic defect
underlying the Court’s finding of a violation so as not to overburden the
Convention system with large numbers of applications deriving from the
same cause. Such measures should therefore include a scheme which offers
to those affected redress for the Convention violation identified in the instant
judgment in relation to the present applicant.257
The Court went further and noted that Poland ‘should, therefore, through
appropriate legal and administrative measures, secure the effective and exped-
itious realisation of the entitlement in question in respect of the remaining
Bug River claimants, in accordance with the principles for the protection of
property rights laid down in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, having particular regard
to the principles relating to compensation’.258
253 Elisabeth Lambert, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2nd edn, 2008), 27.
254 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001,
vol. II, pt 2, 31–143, Art. 30 and its commentary.
255 See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, annex to GA Res. 60/147 of 16 December 2005,
Principle 23.
256 Buyse, ‘The Pilot Judgment Procedure’ (n. 244), 304–7.
257 ECtHR, Broniowski (n. 237), para. 193.
258 Ibid., para. 194.
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The Court did not expressly order Poland to reform its legislation, but it did
suggest this, as well as the establishment of a domestic reparation programme
to provide redress to victims of the Bug River situation. This is a landmark case
that shows that the Court is willing to engage with other forms of reparation,
including general measures and guarantees of non-repetition, in relation to
large-scale human rights violations that evidence the existence of a structural
problem.
While pilot judgments apply only to a minority of cases,259 the Court
codified this practice in 2011, in Rule 61 of its Rules of the Court. Of significant
importance, the Rule indicates that the Court can initiate such a procedure of
its own motion, that such cases will be processed with priority and the types of
remedial measure required (individual and/or general), even establishing
a time frame for compliance. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Court
may not decide on just satisfaction in whole or in part pending compliance
with the remedial measures specified in the pilot judgment.260 In the case of
Broniowski, for example, the Court adjourned its decision under Article 41,
pending the response of Poland in relation to the remedial measures indicated
by the Court.261
2. Quasi-Pilot Judgments
Quasi-pilot judgments also deal with structural problems arising out of cases to
be decided by the Court. As with pilot judgments, they are based on Article 46
ECHR, but quasi-pilot judgments do not include ‘binding obligations in the
operative provisions of the judgments’.262 Mowbray refers to them as ‘judg-
ments where the Court has indicated non-financial remedial measures with-
out invoking the pilot judgment procedure’.263
Quasi-pilot judgments have also been used to deal with large-scale gross
human rights violations that have taken place during armed conflict.264
259 According to Alice Donald and Anne-Katrin Speck, the Court decided twenty-nine pilot
judgments between 2004 and 2016. See Donald and Speck, ‘The European Court of Human
Rights’ Remedial Practice’ (n. 247), 5.
260 Rules of the Court, as amended in 14 November 2016, available at https://echr.coe.int/Doc
uments/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf.
261 ECtHR, Broniowski (n. 237), para. 198.
262 Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 4th edn, 2017), 91.
263 Alastair Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Indication of
Remedial Measures’, Human Rights Law Review 17 (2017), 451–78 (452).
264 Sicilianos, ‘The Involvement of the European Court’ (n. 234), 240.
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An important example is Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia,265 in which the
Court had to deal with the lack of investigation of eight cases of enforced
disappearance in Chechnya and Ingushetia.
This judgment is ground-breaking because, here, the Court recognised that
there was a systemic or structural problem related to the lack of investigation of
disappearance cases. The ECtHR indicates in the judgment that, by 2012, it
had already decided more than 120 similar cases and that many more were
pending.266 As a consequence, the Court addresses both individual and
general measures that Russia should take to deal with the victims of the
case, as well as with other victims in the same situation. Furthermore, given
the gravity of the violations the Court found, it did not adjourn its decision in
similar cases.267
The Court indicated that Russia should implement individual and general
measures under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, but that ‘it is
not for the Court to determine what measures of redress may be appropriate
for a respondent State to take in accordance with its obligations under Article
46 of the Convention’.268 Nevertheless, the Court included seven pages of
‘guidance’ on the types of measure that Russia should adopt to deal with the
situation of the victims’ families and to safeguard the effectiveness of the
investigations.269 The level of advice that the Court gave to the State is
remarkable. For example, it advised creation of ‘a single, sufficiently high-
level body in charge of solving disappearances in the region, which would
enjoy unrestricted access to all relevant information and would work on the
basis of trust and partnership with the relatives of the disappeared’.270 In
relation to the investigations, the Court advised that ‘the investigatory author-
ity would have to identify the leading agencies and commanding officers of
special operations aimed at identifying and capturing suspected illegal insur-
gents in given areas and at given times, and the procedure for recording and
reporting such operations’.271
The guidance provided by the Court on the general measures to Russia
echoed the recommendations made by Council of Europe bodies such as the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
265 ECtHR, Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 18December 2012, Application Nos
2944/06, 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 42509/10, para. 3.
266 Ibid., para. 216.
267 Ibid., para. 220.
268 Ibid., para. 212.
269 Ibid., paras 221–39.
270 Ibid., para. 225.
271 Ibid., para. 233.
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Degrading Treatment of Punishment and the International Committee of the
Red Cross on how to address these problems, but it stressed those measures
that, in its view, were essential to address the structural issues at stake.272 It
based its views on international and national consensus about the problems at
stake and possible solutions.
The Court also awarded compensation to the victims in the case under
Article 41 ECHR. All of the applicants received non-pecuniary damages
jointly or individually (approximately 60,000 EUR), as well as costs and
expenses. Some also received pecuniary damages.273
3. Inter-State Complaints Concerning Large-Scale Violations during Armed
Conflict
Of the few inter-State complaints presented before the ECtHR (twenty-four),
some concern large-scale violations of human rights and/or other types of
human rights violation suffered by citizens of the applicant State as a result of
actions of the respondent State.274 The most significant one, from a reparation
perspective, is Cyprus v. Turkey.275 It is also the first inter-State complaint in
which the Court ordered just satisfaction. The case dealt with Turkish military
operations in Northern Cyprus and involved various alleged violations of the
European Convention, including Greek Cypriot missing persons and the
harm suffered by their next of kin, violations of the right to property and
home of displaced people, and the rights of Greek Cypriots living in Northern
Cyprus, of the Turkish Cypriots and of the Gypsy community.276 According to
the Court, approximately 1,491Greek Cypriots were missing277 and more than
211,000 of them had been displaced.278
When the Court decided the merits of the case in 2001, it adjourned its
decision on just satisfaction because the topic was not yet ready for decision.279
This was partly because, in 1999, both Turkey and Cyprus had agreed that if
the Court were to find violations, they would agree on a separate procedure to
272 Ibid., paras 225, or 72, 74, 77 and 80–2.
273 Ibid., Annex II to the judgment, 68.
274 ECtHR, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Court (Plenary), Judgment of 18 January 1978,
Application No. 5310/71, or ECtHR, Georgia v. Russian Federation, Grand Chamber,
Judgment of 3 July 2014, Application No. 13255/07.
275 ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 10 May 2001, Application No.
25781/94.
276 Ibid., para. 3.
277 Ibid., para. 20.
278 Ibid., para. 28.
279 Ibid., operative paragraph VIII.
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settle claims under Article 41 ECHR.280 Given the lack of action by Turkey in
relation to the views of the Court, Cyprus asked the Court to hand down
a judgment on just satisfaction in March 2010.281 The Grand Chamber
decided on just satisfaction in 2014.
Whether the Court could order reparation in an inter-State complaint and
if it could do so nine years after the initial judgment were the key issues in the
litigation. The Court dismissed Turkey’s objections, noting that ‘the obliga-
tion to take individual and/or general measures and the payment of just
satisfaction are two distinct forms of redress, and the former in no way
precludes the latter’.282
The ECtHR had considered only once before – in Ireland v. United
Kingdom283 – the use of Article 41 in an inter-State complaint, deciding then
that it was not necessary to award just satisfaction. The Court further empha-
sised that Article 41 clearly reflects the general principle of international law
established by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the
Factory at Chorzów case,284 according to which ‘the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form’.285 For the
Court, while this principle evokes the idea of diplomatic protection, the
ECHR aims to protect the human being, and hence ‘if just satisfaction is
afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be done for the benefit of
individual victims’.286
This reasoning allowed the Court to order just satisfaction for 1,456missing
persons – 30,000 EUR for non-pecuniary damages to the surviving next of
kin – and 60,000 EUR to the enclaved Greek Cypriots of the Karpas
Peninsula,287 including any tax chargeable.288
In his concurring opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (joined by Judge
Vučinić) described the judgment as ‘the most important contribution to peace
in Europe in the history of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights’, because the
Court awarded what is equivalent to punitive damages against Turkey:
280 ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, Judgment on Just Satisfaction, Application No.
25781/94, 12 May 2014, para. 2.
281 Ibid., para. 13.
282 Ibid., para. 27.
283 ECtHR, Ireland v. United Kingdom (n. 274).
284 PCIJ, Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów,Merits, Judgment, 13 September 1928, Series
A, No. 17 (1928).
285 ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (n. 280), para. 41.
286 Ibid., para. 46.
287 Ibid., para. 47.
288 Ibid., paras 57–9.
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[T]he message to member States of the Council of Europe is clear: those
member States that wage war, invade or support foreign armed intervention
in other member States must pay for their unlawful actions and the conse-
quences of their actions, and the victims, their families and the States of
which they are nationals have a vested and enforceable right to be duly and
fully compensated by the responsible warring State. War and its tragic
consequences are no longer tolerable in Europe and those member States
that do not comply with this principle must be made judicially accountable
for their actions, without prejudice to additional political consequences.289
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s understanding of punitive damages could be
disputed under international law, where compensation is not punitive in
nature, not even in times of armed conflict,290 and because the amounts
awarded to victims are not disproportionately high. However, the judge is
correct in indicating that a significant shift in the jurisprudence of the Court
has taken place.
This case is remarkable from a subsidiarity perspective. At first glance, some
might argue that no subsidiarity operated in the 2014 judgment because the Court
awarded compensation.However, the issue ismore nuanced than that. TheCourt
acted on just satisfaction only after having given Turkey plenty of opportunity to
comply with theGrandChamber’s judgment on themerits. Indeed, thirteen years
and three days elapsed between the first judgment and the decision on
just satisfaction, and during this time various other cases related to similar issues
were decided by the Court. The failure of Turkey to act meant that leaving the
issue of reparation at its discretion could not continue to be the operating principle
and theCourt, responding toCyprus’s request, considered that itwasnecessary and
legitimate for it to order compensation for victims.TheCourt becameprescriptive:
it not only ordered compensation, but also awarded it in a higher amount than that
ordered in other cases concerning similar facts, as seen in Varnava and
Others v. Turkey,291 concerning missing people in Northern Cyprus. In Varnava,
in which the applicants even requested punitive damages, the Court dismissed
such claims, but recognised that victims suffered non-pecuniary damage as
a result of the intense suffering of not knowing what happened to their loved
ones for so many decades, awarding 12,000 EUR to each of the applicants.292
289 Ibid.
290 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 2001 (n. 254), Art.
36 and its commentary.
291 ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 18 September 2009,
Application Nos 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90,
16072/90 and 16073/90.
292 Ibid., para. 225.
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Varnava was decided in 2009, almost five years earlier than Cyprus
v. Turkey. While the amount of money is higher, it does not exceed what would
be the full compensation owed for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm
to each single victim. The amount certainly represents the seriousness of the
matter, but it does not indicate that, in its decision, the ECtHR wished to
punish Turkey.
C. The Court’s Jurisprudence on War-Related Large-Scale Human Rights
Violations and Domestic Reparation Programmes
These developments in the jurisprudence of the Court on systematic and gross
human rights violations that took place during armed conflict show that, in
these types of case, the ECtHR does not follow its otherwise usual practice of
issuing declaratory judgments that give discretion to States, in dialogue with
theCommittee ofMinisters, to identify the best means to provide reparation to
victims. Quite the contrary, the ECtHR has often awarded compensation,
generally for moral damages, for the violations suffered, including for the lack
of an effective investigation – something that, as already explained, does not
happen in all of the cases it decides.
The ECtHR has been willing to employ Article 46 ECHR to address some
large-scale violations that occurred during armed conflict – and their struc-
tural roots. Nevertheless, the pilot judgment mechanism has not been used to
deal with some of the underlying structural problems that can be identified in
relation to gross violations of human rights. For example, by the time of
writing (August 2020), the Court had not issued pilot judgments to address
problems related to the lack of diligent investigations of gross human rights
violations, such as enforced disappearances or killings in countries such as
Turkey or Russia.293 The approach of the Court in such cases is to order
compensation under Article 41 and, exceptionally, to indicate, but not order,
possible general measures. Next, the Committee of Ministers deals with the
execution of the judgments, grouping them and putting them under enhanced
supervision. It is then down to the State in question to decide on the measures
that are needed to deal with the violations, while the Committee of Ministers
monitors compliance. That pilot judgments have not been used in these cases
might be the consequence of these States not consenting to the procedure, but
293 Some would dispute this statement. According to Kurban, ECtHR, Doğan and Others
v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 November 2004, Application Nos 8803–8811/02, 8813/02 and
8815–8819/02, is a pilot judgment: Kurban, ‘Forsaking Individual Justice’ (n. 243), 740.
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also of the fact that lack of implementation of the pilot judgments by these
countries could harm the legitimacy and authority of the ECtHR.
The reasons for this approach of the Court to systemic violations might be
the need not only to address, once and for all, systemic problems that have
a detrimental impact on people living in those States, but also to control the
volume of cases that reach the Court. Equally, the Court is mindful of the
increasingly challenging context in which the Council of Europe operates and
of the need to respond, as required, to those challenges. This means that the
ECtHR uses different degrees of subsidiarity when dealing with reparation for
large-scale and systematic violations. The more serious the violations and the
less likely that the State will act, as in Cyprus v. Turkey, the less deference is
given to the State. Some, clearly limited, deference is given in pilot judgments
to help States that consent to the procedure to address structural problems.
Quasi-pilot judgments also exhibit less deference to States and more prescrip-
tion as to what should be done.
These cases and practices at the Court illustrate a different treatment of
subsidiarity in relation to reparation. The analysis, however, has not taken into
account the ECtHR’s approach to domestic reparation programmes.
Certainly, domestic reparation programmes have also been set up in
Europe, albeit, as will be shown, in different contexts from those in the
Americas region. In relation to these, the Court has been asked to decide on
cases in which existing domestic reparation programmes have allegedly failed
to provide reparation and/or the Court has advised States to set up compensa-
tion mechanisms, meaning domestic reparation programmes, to deal with
a large number of cases.
The next part of this chapter considers the ECtHR’s treatment of domestic
reparation programmes.
1. Broniowski
It is not a coincidence that the first pilot judgment handed down by the
ECtHR was in Broniowski v. Poland.294 Indeed, a representative number of
pilot judgments deal with the right to property cases under Article 1 of Protocol
1 to the European Convention. Many of them concerned decisions taken
during a transition from totalitarianism to democracy or during World War II.
At stake in Broniowski was compensation owed to thousands of victims who
lost their land in what were, before World War II, the eastern provinces of
Poland. After the War, the eastern border of Poland was fixed along the Bug
294 ECtHR, Broniowski (n. 237).
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River, resulting in Poland losing 19.78 per cent of its territory.295 The
Republican Agreements were signed at the time by Poland, Lithuania,
Ukraine, and Belarus. Under these Agreements, Poland agreed to pay com-
pensation to persons who had to abandon their properties. Many of the victims
had been compensated by Poland, but not all, as in the case of the applicant,
Mr Broniowski.296 The Court ordered Poland to take all necessary legal and
administrative measures to ensure that victims of Bug River cases could obtain
adequate compensation.
The Court therefore deferred to Poland the choice of legal and administra-
tive measures to be implemented to solve the structural problem. Poland
amended legislation, put in place a domestic reparation programme, and
provided the Committee of Ministers with a careful account of the steps
taken to comply with the execution of the judgment.297 The Committee
closed the examination of the execution of the case in 2009.
Importantly, the Bug River claims before the ECtHR did not stop with
Broniowski. Indeed, new claims arrived, challenging the 20 per cent ceiling
established by the new legal framework, meaning that victims would receive
only up to 20 per cent of the current value of the original property they had
lost.298 Poland argued that financial reasons explained the 20 per cent ceiling
and that ‘any increase could only be possible at the expense of other members
of society’.299 The applicants considered the ceiling unjustifiable and in
contravention of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. Furthermore, since 1946, Poland
had recognised their right to equivalent compensation and their accrued right,
even if they had not yet received compensation.300
The assessment of the Court is carefully substantiated with two arguments:
that the right to property is not absolute; and that the principle of subsidiarity
should apply. For the Court, the right to property under Protocol 1 does not
imply ‘full compensation in all circumstances’ because the public interest
might be at stake.301 Equally, the Court reiterated that ‘the State has a wide
295 Ibid., para. 12.
296 Ibid., paras 2 and 10–12.
297 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution ResDH(2005)58 concerning the judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights of 22 June 2004 (Grand Chamber) in the case of
Broniowski against Poland, 5 July 2005 and Final Resolution CM/ResDH (2009) 89,
Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Broniowski against
Poland.
298 ECtHR, Wolkenberg and Others v. Poland, Judgment of 4 December 2007, Application No
50003/99, paras 25–6.
299 Ibid., para. 40.
300 Ibid., paras 45–6.
301 Ibid., para. 60.
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margin of appreciation when passing laws in the context of a change of
political and economic regime and that in such contexts there might even
arise situations where the lack of any compensation would be found compat-
ible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.302 A further point
raised by the Court was that Poland had to pay compensation for a situation it
did not cause. Indeed, as stated by theCourt, ‘the purpose of the compensation
was not to secure reimbursement for a distinct expropriation but to mitigate
the effects of the taking of property which was not attributable to the Polish
State’.303 This led the Court to conclude that the 20 per cent ceiling was not
‘unreasonable or disproportionate’.304 Based on this, and respectful of the pilot
judgment in Broniowski, plus the fact that the applicants had not sought
redress domestically, the Court concluded that it should not award compen-
sation to the applicants of the case.305 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that
failures of the compensation scheme in Poland to redress Bug River claimants
could trigger the Court to reopen the cases it had struck out.306 The Court
decided in a similar manner other cases against Poland with relatively identi-
cal claims.307
This case shows that the Court grants a margin of appreciation to States
when transitions are at stake and when non-fundamental rights, such as the
right to property, are in play. This appears to indicate that while the Court is
ready to put pressure on the State to sort out structural problems for large-scale
violations of the right to property, the Court is ready to accept strong limita-
tions on compensation, and even to waive it, if the case so requires.
2. Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania
Another example of a pilot judgment dealing with the right to property under
Article 1 of Protocol 1 and domestic reparation programmes isMaria Atanasiu
and Others v. Romania.308 In 1989, Romania also underwent a change of
political regime. During the Communist era, various properties were expro-
priated. When democracy was established, Romania pledged full compensa-
tion for such properties. While Romania had in place a legal framework and
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid., para. 64.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid., para. 75.
306 Ibid., para. 77.
307 ECtHR,Witkowska-Tobola v. Poland,Decision to strike out of 4December 2007, Application
No. 11208/02.
308 ECtHR, Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania, Judgment of 12 October 2010, Application
Nos 30767/05 and 33800/06.
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mechanisms to provide compensation, they were ineffective, and victims
turned to the ECtHR.
The Court had decided individual cases on the very same issue against
Romania without using the pilot judgment system,309 and it had given defer-
ence to Romania to let it address the problem. However, given that no changes
took place domestically to ensure that victims would secure compensation, the
Court adopted a pilot judgment recommending that the State adopt some
general measures to address the structural problem. The Court recommended
that Romania remove any obstacles to access restitution or compensation, or
obstacles to ‘the establishment of simplified and effective procedures as
a matter of urgency on the basis of legislation and of coherent judicial and
administrative practice’.310 Furthermore, the Court decided to adjourn deci-
sion in other cases for eighteen months, to give Romania the opportunity to
adopt measures to remedy the situation.311
Finally, the Court awarded compensation for material and non-material
damages to the three applicants in the case, given their ages and the unreason-
able period of time they had to wait to secure reparation. It considered it to be
‘a final and exhaustive settlement’312 of the case, awarding two of them 65,000
EUR and the other 115,000 EUR.
The Court recognised that Romania has a margin of appreciation – as
a corollary of subsidiarity – to decide on how best to address its structural
problems.313 Nevertheless, the Court did not want the applicants to wait any
longer to obtain reparation; rather, the Court considered it had the authority to
resolve their situation by directly ordering compensation. Importantly, the
Court became the last instance (remedy) for the applicants, because the
indication it gave when awarding compensation could be taken to mean
that they would not be able to use a domestic reparation programme to obtain
further compensation.
However, as these cases and others show,314 the Court also appears to
believe that an important mechanism to provide reparation for structural
violations is a domestic reparation programme. In neither Broniowski nor
309 ECtHR, Viaşu v. Romania, Judgment of 9 December 2008, Application No. 75951/01;
ECtHR, Faimblat v. Romania, Judgment of 13 January 2009, Application No. 23066/02;
ECtHR, Katz v. Romania, Judgment of 20 January 2009, Application No. 29739/03.
310 ECtHR, Atanasiu (n. 308), paras 229–36.
311 Ibid., para. 241.
312 Ibid., para. 253.
313 Ibid., para. 236.
314 ECtHR, Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment of 3November 2009, ApplicationNo.
27912/02; ECtHR, Manushage Puto and Others v. Albania, Judgment of 31 July 2012,
Application Nos 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09.
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any of the subsequent cases against Poland, nor in the case of Atanasiu and
Others v. Romania, did the Court consider a domestic reparation programme
to be an inadequate or ineffective remedy to provide reparation.
3. Kurić and Others v. Slovenia: Recommending a Domestic Reparation
Programme
Not only has the Court considered domestic reparation programmes as poten-
tially adequate and effective domestic remedies, when faced with structural
problems causing systemic human rights violations, but also it has even gone
further, to recommend the establishment of such programmes. For example,
in another war-related case, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia,315 the Court was
asked to make a decision concerning the ‘erased’ – that is, those persons who
were citizens of any of the six former republics of Yugoslavia, but who, upon
independence of Slovenia after the war, were erased from the system of
permanent residence in Slovenia, depriving them of pensions, as well as access
to healthcare services and other services, thus making them stateless. The
Court used the pilot judgment system to address ‘the prolonged failure of the
Slovenian authorities, in spite of the Constitutional Court’s leading judg-
ments, to regularise the applicants’ residence status following their “erasure”
and to provide them with adequate redress’,316 ordering that Slovenia should
set up a domestic reparation programme to compensate victims.317
Importantly, the Grand Chamber considered that possible compensation for
pecuniary damage under Article 41 ECHR was not ready for decision, but
awarded the payment of 20,000 EUR as non-pecuniary damages to each
applicant because of the suffering they had experienced.318
4. Doğan and Others v. Turkey and Ĭçier v. Turkey
The case ofDoğan and Others v. Turkey deals with a systemic problem of mass
evictions from properties in south-east Turkey and related human rights
violations as a result of government actions to deal with the threat posed by
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).319 This was not the first of such cases.
Indeed, Akdivar v. Turkey was decided first, in 1998, and the Court ordered
315 ECtHR, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, Judgment of 26 June 2012, Application No. 26828/06.
316 Ibid., para. 408.
317 Ibid., para. 416.
318 Ibid., paras 424–5.
319 ECtHR, Doğan (n. 293), para. 3.
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compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages suffered by all appli-
cants in that case.320
In Doğan and Others, Turkey argued lack of exhaustion of domestic rem-
edies and provided information to the Court about the remedies available to
the victims domestically. The Court considered that such remedies were
neither adequate nor effective, because when a claim relates to forced eviction
and destruction of property, an effective investigation leading to the identifi-
cation of those responsible needs to take place besides compensation, if
appropriate, to fulfil the requirements of Article 13 ECHR.321 This allowed
the Court to assess the merits of the case and to pronounce on the proportion-
ality of the interference with the properties of the applicants in their village, as
well as with their other rights. The Court stressed that remedies were inad-
equate and ineffective, and that:
[T]he refusal of access to Boydaş [the applicants’ village] had serious and
harmful effects that have hindered the applicants’ right to enjoyment of their
possessions for almost ten years, during which time they have been living . . .
in conditions of extreme poverty, with inadequate heating, sanitation and
infrastructure . . . Their situation was compounded by a lack of financial
assets, having received no compensation for deprivation of their possessions,
and the need to seek employment and shelter in overcrowded cities and
towns, where unemployment levels and housing facilities have been
described as disastrous . . . 322
Despite the lack of remedies at the domestic level to address the violations
suffered by the applicants and obtain reparation, the Court adjourned deci-
sion on compensation, expecting Turkey and the applicants to agree on
a settlement.323 At the time of the decision by the ECtHR, Turkey was in the
process of adopting a National Compensation Law to deal with the harm
caused to those evicted in south-east Turkey and hence the Court gave Turkey
an opportunity to address the problem. The Law on Compensation for Losses
resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism was adopted some
days after the judgment in July 2004. The ECtHR decided on just satisfaction
in 2006 because the parties did not reach an agreement, in the fact of very
strong arguments from Turkey that the applicants should use the domestic
320 ECtHR, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 1 April 1998, Application Nos 99/1995/
605/693, paras 15–38.
321 ECtHR, Doğan (n. 293), para. 106.
322 Ibid., para. 153.
323 Ibid., paras 165–8.
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reparation programme.324 The Court ordered pecuniary damages as a result of
deterioration or lack of care of property, loss of earnings, and costs of alterna-
tive accommodation. Each of the fifteen applicants was awarded an average of
18,633 EUR, as well as costs and expenses. No moral damages besides the
judgments were awarded to the victims.325
After the Court decided Doğan and Others, but prior to its decision on just
satisfaction in the same case, the ECtHR decided İçyer v. Turkey.326 This case
is of great importance since the Court examined in it whether the domestic
reparation programme established in Turkey was adequate and effective.
Providing a brief description of the domestic reparation programme’s working
methods and of the data Turkey submitted about the achievements of the
programme, the Court arrived at the conclusion that ‘the remedy in question
is available not only in theory but also in practice’.327 Among the various
grounds put forward by the applicant on why Turkey’s domestic reparation
programme should not be used was the fact that he had lodged the application
with the ECtHR long before Turkey adopted its new Law, and he argued that
the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies applies in relation to the moment
at which the application is presented before the Court and not after.328 The
Court responded by saying that there are exceptions to this rule. Among them,
it noted that it is the State that has to act under the supervision of the
Committee of Ministers to resolve the problem or else the Court will have
to decide a ‘lengthy series of comparable cases’, which could impact negatively
on the Court.329
The Court dismissed the case, given that the applicants had not exhausted
the remedy established under the new Law. The Court also dismissed approxi-
mately 1,500 similar applications on the same ground.330 The Court had not
referred toDoğan andOthers as a pilot judgment, but it did so in its decision in
İçyer v. Turkey – possibly out of the need to strike out the list of 1,500
comparable cases.331
This line of cases has been strongly criticised by many who dispute the
effectiveness of domestic reparation programmes and who see the cases as
324 ECtHR,Doğan andOthers v. Turkey, Judgment on Just Satisfaction of 13October 2006, paras
25–44.
325 Ibid., paras 45–64.
326 ECtHR, İçyer v. Turkey, Decision on Admissibility of 12 January 2006, Application No.
18888/02.
327 Ibid., para. 77.
328 Ibid., paras 79–83.
329 Ibid., para. 84.
330 ECtHR, Doğan, Judgment on Just Satisfaction (n. 324), para. 6.
331 ECtHR, İçyer, Decision on Admissibility (n. 326), para. 94.
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closing a door in Strasbourg for victims of gross human rights violations. In the
words of Kurban:
Having conducted fact-finding hearings in 66Kurdish cases in the early 2000s
and having issued hundreds of judgments against Turkey for its treatment of
its Kurdish citizens, the ECtHRwas the best placed international authority to
make an informed assessment about the effectiveness of the new remedy. But,
due to political expediency and/or fatigue, it chose not to do so.332
These cases demonstrate the Court’s deference to Turkey on the reparation of
harm caused to victims in the south-east of the country. The exception to this
is Doğan and Others, in which, in the judgment handed down in 2006, the
Court awarded pecuniary damages to the fifteen victims, probably because it
had already decided the case in 2004 and had given the opportunity to the
parties to settle the issue. Thus, while the Court awarded just satisfaction in the
case, it did so only after giving Turkey the opportunity to provide reparation to
victims.
The case of İçyer shows not only deference but also a Court ready to refrain
from considering similar cases to Doğan and Others that had already been
filed before the Court for its decision, before Turkey set up its domestic
reparation programme. Furthermore, the decision is the result of a prima
facie analysis of Turkey’s domestic reparation programme that failed to estab-
lish clear criteria as to how such programmes should be assessed under the
ECHR.What was at stake here was not simply the right to reparation of victims
for harm suffered; it was also the possibility of an effective remedy before
a supranational body when States do not act according to their obligations
under international treaties. The ECtHR gave prevalence to subsidiarity over
the right to a remedy before an international body.
D. What Explains the Approach of the Court to Subsidiarity when Dealing
with Reparation?
The previous sections have highlighted the important changes on reparation
and subsidiarity that have taken place at the ECtHR. Certainly, as Judge
Sicilianos puts it, ‘the traditional approach, according to which the judgments
of the Court are only of a declaratory nature and the Committee of Ministers
has an exclusive competence to supervise their execution, does not correspond
to recent practice’.333 Başak Çalı has also noted this important shift, indicating
332 Kurban, ‘Forsaking Individual Justice’ (n. 243), 750.
333 Ibid., 235.
244 Clara Sandoval
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/23753176/WORKINGFOLDER/CORREA-RG/9781108480956C03.3D 245 [179–264] 22.8.2020
10:15AM
that ‘the system has . . . evolved from being purely declaratory to adopting
a more subtle and selective intrusiveness over time’.334 This can be taken to
mean that the Court is, in practice, giving less deference to States. However,
the previous sections have also shown that the Court is not renouncing
subsidiarity, but rather preserving it in different ways. For example, it gives
time to States to take action before stepping in; after giving guidance to States,
it defers to them the cases.
Alice Donald and Anne Katrin Speck provide important statistical informa-
tion to show that, while the Court is engaging more with non-declaratory
judgments335 and is dealing with other measures, including general ones, the
number of cases between 2004 and 2016 in which the Court included ‘specific
remedial measures was tiny as a percentage of all adverse Chamber andGrand
Chamber judgments’336 – another way of showing that subsidiarity remains
strongly embedded in the Court’s jurisprudence. They indicate that, at its peak
in 2014, specific remedial measures ‘represented only six percent of such
judgments’ (i.e. 34 of 548). Furthermore, statistics show that, of all pilot
judgments and Article 46 judgments combined, the indication of general
measures prevails over individual measures.337 Once again, this shows that
the Court is trying to help States to address the structural problems that
challenge the ECHR machinery by means of the indication of general meas-
ures, but is leaving to States decisions on individual measures.
That subsidiarity continues to take hold in the European System is also
shown by the adoption of Protocol 14 to the ECHR, which added new
admissibility criteria to that already applied by the Court, or by Protocol 15,
not yet in force, which amends the preamble to the European Convention to
include both the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation.338
Article 1 of Protocol 15 reads:
Affirming that theHighContracting Parties, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and
freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in
doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this
Convention.
334 Çalı, ‘Explaining Variation’ (n. 188), 221.
335 They are taking into account all pilot judgments and all decisions under Art. 46 ECHR.
336 Donald and Speck, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ (n. 247), 6.
337 Ibid., 7.
338 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Strasbourg, 24 June 2013, available at https://echr.coe.int/Docume
nts/Protocol_15_ENG.pdf.
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Rask Madsen has also concluded, after conducting quantitative analysis of the
use of subsidiarity andmargin of appreciation by the ECtHR, that ‘the ECtHR
is indeed providing more subsidiarity following the Brighton Declaration’,339
which was adopted by the High-Level Conference on the Future of the
ECtHR in 2012. While his comments particularly relate to decisions of the
Court concerningmerits, his remarks resonate with the findings of this chapter
on subsidiarity in relation to reparation.
What explains the approach of the Court to reparations and to subsidiarity?
Three factors could help to explain and contextualise the approach of the
Court: the unmanageable volume of cases arriving before the Court; the
nature of the violations alleged to have taken place, linked to the virtual
inability of some of the signatories to the ECHR to adequately respond to
alleged violations of it; and the lack of implementation of the Court’s
judgments.
1. The Volume of Cases Arriving before the Court
Themembership of the Council of Europe expanded from ten states in 1949 to
forty-seven Member States in 2019. Indeed, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in
the 1990s, various States in Eastern Europe joined the Council, such as Russia,
Latvia, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. Other States also joined
the organisation at the beginning of the new century, such as Serbia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.
As membership of the system has broadened, so has the number of cases
brought to Strasbourg. During the period of accession of new Member States,
for example, applications to the then operational European Commission on
Human Rights rose from 404 in 1981, through 2,307 in 1993, to 4,750 in 1997.340
The Court decided ten cases in 1960; in 2017, it decided 15,595 cases on the
merits, declaring inadmissible or striking out a further 70,356 applications.341
Equally, as the number of cases before the ECtHR has increased, there
has also been a high influx of cases concerning large-scale human rights
violations arising out of armed conflicts.342 According to the Steering
339 Mikael Rask Madsen, Rebalancing European Human: Has the Brighton Declaration
Engendered a New Deal on Human Rights in Europe? Icourts Working Paper Series 100
(2017), 32.
340 ECtHR, Annual Report 2001, para. 6.
341 ECtHR Statistics 2017, available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_annual_2017_ENG
.pdf.
342 Steering Committee for Human Rights, CDDH Report on the Longer-Term Future of the
System of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2015, 49, available at https://rm
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Committee for Human Rights, there were more than 3,000 such cases
arriving before the Court in 2015.343 Equally, as the ECtHR indicates,
‘many of the about 57,350 cases pending before the [Court] are . . . “repeti-
tive cases”, which derive from a common dysfunction at the national
level’.344 While not all such cases concern gross and large-scale human
rights violations of the European Convention in times of armed conflict,
many of them do relate to such.
2. The Fragile Political Context of the New Council of Europe Member
States and Gross Human Rights Violations
An important feature of the States that joined the Council of Europe
following the fall of the Berlin Wall is that they were, and remain, fragile
democracies with weak rule of law. In a way, the new Member States of the
Council of Europe are similar to various countries in the Americas region
and, indeed, several of them were emerging from conflict (such as those in
the former Yugoslavia). Some of these countries are still facing armed
conflicts or dealing with the legacy of mass atrocities, such as Armenia and
Azerbaijan concerning the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict/occupation,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, and Georgia in the two autono-
mous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or Russia and the situation in
Chechnya.
Turkey became amember of the Council of Europe in 1950, but its political
situation is as fragile as that of some of the States mentioned above. Conflict
was and remains present in Turkey, as evidenced by the occupation of
Northern Cyprus since 1974, the conflict with the PKK in south-east Turkey
(including with Iraq) and the conflict in Syria.345
All of these conflict situations put extra pressure on Strasbourg, because
persons under the jurisdiction of these States, believing that their domestic
systems do not provide them with an effective and adequate remedy to deal
with alleged violations, have turned to the ECtHR to protect their rights.




344 ECtHR, Factsheet: Pilot Judgments (n. 236), 1.
345 Other countries in the region are also involved in conflict situations, such as the United
Kingdom. However, those are different types of conflict, given that the UK is working
extraterritorially in occupied territories such as Iraq, and therefore, while the violations
might be very serious and the victims many, the cases arriving to Strasbourg are never
comparable to those coming from countries such as Russia or Turkey.
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against Russia in 2017346 and 31,053 against Turkey in the same year.347 The
majority of judgments the Court has handed down have been against Turkey,
Italy, and Russia.348
Furthermore, the nature of the violations brought to the attention of the
Court has also changed. Of the total number of cases decided by the Court up
until 2017, 15 per cent involved a violation of the right to life, or the prohibition
of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This number
could rise because, according to the Court, in recent years these types of
violation have increased in frequency.349 If this data is compared to that of
2010, it is clear that the number has become significant: in 2010, violations
of these rights were not relevant enough to be classified as self-standing viola-
tions in the statistics of the Court and were counted as part of ‘other violations’
when considering the subject matter of the judgments handed down.350
3. Strengthening Implementation of the Court’s Judgments
A key concern of the ECtHR is to secure that its judgments are implemented
by national authorities. This has been recognised in Europe by means of the
Committee of Ministers indicating that the ‘speedy and efficient execution of
judgments is essential for the credibility and efficacy of the [Convention] as
a constitutional instrument of European public order on which the demo-
cratic stability of the continent depends’.351 Furthermore, the High-Level
Conference meeting in Brussels in March 2015 adopted the Brussels
Declaration on the Implementation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, ‘Our Shared Responsibility’. This Declaration specifically
indicates that the High-Level Conference ‘emphasises the importance of the
full, effective and prompt execution of judgments and of a strong political
commitment by the State Parties in this respect, thus strengthening the
credibility of the Court and the Convention system in general’.352
346 ECtHR, Russia, March 2018, available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Russia_ENG.pdf.
347 ECtHR,Turkey,March 2018, available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Turkey_ENG.pdf.
348 ECtHR, Overview: 1959–2017, March 2018, 3.
349 Ibid., 7.
350 ECtHR, 50 Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights – Some Facts and
Figures, April 2010, 6, available at https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figure
s_1959_2009_ENG.pdf.
351 Committee of Ministers, Reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1576 (2002),
26 March 2003.
352 High-Level Conference on the Implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, ‘Our Shared Responsibility’, Brussels Declaration, 27March 2015, available at https://
echr.coe.int/Documents/Brussels_Declaration_ENG.pdf.
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The payment of compensation as just satisfaction has not been a problem, as
a general rule.353 However, complying with other forms of reparation, such as
general measures and guarantees of non-repetition, remains a challenge in
Europe.354 The other big obstacle faced by the ECtHR and the Committee of
Ministers is the excessive amount of time States take to comply with judgments.
A close look at the statistics provided by the Committee of Ministers confirms
that implementation is a major challenge in the region. For example, in the
majority of leading cases (which reveal structural problems), pending compliance
remains very high, with 1,555 still open in 2015 and only 153 closed in the
same year.355 Equally, the number of leading cases pending compliance
increased year on year from 1996, although it has slightly decreased since 2017.356
Indeed, it grew from 73 in 1996 to 1,245 in 2019; by 2015, there had been 10,652 cases
pending compliance before the Committee of Ministers.357 This number had
decreased to 9,941 in 2016358 and to 7,500 in 2017.359By 2019, there were 5,231 cases
pending compliance.360 Furthermore, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey remain the
States with the majority of cases under enhanced supervision.361
The Steering Committee for Human Rights identified two key problems
regarding lack of implementation: first, political reasons, particularly in rela-
tion to serious large-scale violations where lack of political will to do what the
Court orders remains an obstacle;362 and second, technical/financial problems
in the execution of relatively complex measures.363
353 CDDH Report on the Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on
Human Rights (n. 342), para. 151.
354 Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights 2017, 14.
355 Committee of Ministers, Statistics: Developments in the Number of Cases from 1996 to 2015,
3 June 2016, 3–4.
356 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report, 2019, 52; Department for the Execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Length of the Execution Process:
Pending Cases, 2017, 1.
357 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report, 2019, 52.
358 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report, 2016, 47.
359 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report, 2017, 7.
360 Committee of Ministers, Annual Report, 2019, 52
361 Since 2011, the Committee of Ministers put in place two procedures for the execution of
judgments: a standard procedure and an enhanced one. The latter is used for cases requiring
urgent individual measures or revealing important structural problems (in particular pilot-
judgments) and for inter-state cases. See Council of Europe, ‘The Supervision Process’,
available at www.coe.int/en/web/execution/the-supervision-process.
362 Marinella Marmo, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights:
A Political Battle’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 15 (2008),
235–58 (238).
363 CDDH Report on the Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on
Human Rights (n. 342), paras 134–5.
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E. The Reasoning of the Court on Remedial Measures: Problems
and Consequences
Various aspects of the engagement of the Court with domestic reparation
programmes are to be noted. First, the ECtHR has dealt with domestic
reparation programmes to remedy, as a general rule, not gross human rights
violations but rather large-scale and systematic violations in European States,
prominently related to the right to property.
Given that various countries in Europe have undergone transitions from
repressive regimes and face, or are facing, the legacies of armed conflicts, it
must be remarked that there is not a single case in Europe in which the ECtHR
has had to deal with questions related to the adequacy and effectiveness of
domestic reparation programmes set up to provide redress for gross human
rights violations. The closest could be Turkey’s domestic reparation programme
to compensate the disproportionate evictions in its south-eastern area.
The ECtHR had the opportunity to deal with the German Forced Labour
Compensation Programme to provide reparation to surviving victims of the
Holocaust who were used as forced labourers in Germany and in the occupied
territories during World War II.364 However, as important as those decisions
are, they do not deal with the scope and reach of the right to reparation for
victims of armed conflict, or the adequacy or effectiveness of domestic repar-
ation programmes, but rather with related rights. Consider the example of
a case the ECtHR found admissible and decided on its merits,Woś v. Poland.
This case concerned the lack of access to a court under Article 6(1) ECHR in
relation to claims before the Polish-German Foundation, a mechanism estab-
lished to provide reparation in Poland with money from the German govern-
ment. The applicant did not believe that he had received all compensation
364 See also ECtHR, Pozmamski and Others v. Germany, Judgment on Admissibility of
3 July 2007, Application No. 25101/05. The Court declared this case inadmissible. It con-
cerned the domestic reparation programme set up in Germany to deal with forced labour.
The applicants claimed that the Foundation Law did not provide adequate compensation for
forced labourers and they considered that the waiver of any further claims against Germany
or any of the companies connected to Nationalist Socialist injustice was contrary to the
ECHR. All applicants had received compensation from the domestic reparation programme,
but they brought civil actions under tort law. They were not successful, given the waiver of the
Foundation Law. They claimed that this violated their right to property under Protocol 1
ECHR. The Court found that this right could be limited in the public interest, and that the
public interest of legal certainty for companies and Germany of no more civil claims was
appropriate. The issue then turned to the proportionality of the measure. The Court
considered that the applicants all got compensation, even if it was lower than they expected,
and that the system as it was constituted a ‘fair balance’ between the right to property and the
general interest. Ibid., at point 3.
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owed for the entire period of his forced labour, and he argued that he did not
have a judicial remedy to challenge this because the remedies he tried were
disregarded by authorities claiming lack of jurisdiction over the matter.365
Since substantive rights under the ECHR were at stake, particularly the right
to property, the Court could not abstain from exercising jurisdiction,366 noting
that ‘the applicant could claim, at least on arguable grounds, the right to
receive compensation from the Foundation in respect of the overall period of
his forced labour’.367 The Court concluded that there was a violation to the
applicant’s right to access a court368 and awarded 5,000EUR as non-pecuniary
damages.369
The second aspect of the Court’s engagement to be noted is that the
majority of the domestic reparation programmes set up in Europe are limited
to compensation as a form of reparation. They omit other forms of reparation,
such as restitution, rehabilitation, and satisfaction, crucial for survivors of gross
human rights violations or large-scale violations. This generates questions
about how comprehensive domestic reparation programmes are in Europe
and, more importantly, about the views of the Court on this point. Does the
silence of the Court mean that it leaves it to States to decide the appropriate
forms to provide reparation for such violations? Or does it mean that the Court
considers that it is adequate for a State to provide just compensation for such
violations? Cases such as Doğan and Others appear to indicate that an
investigation is also an important form of reparation. But the Court’s position
in Ĭçyer seems to suggest the contrary, given that the focus of the Court when
considering the existence of an effective remedy was precisely on the compen-
sation dimension of the claim, not on the effectiveness of the investigation.
This raises questions about the approach of the Court to guarantees of non-
repetition and to other forms of reparation.
The third aspect to be noted is that the ECtHR continues to embrace the
principle of subsidiarity, balancing the level of prescriptiveness of its orders or
views against the margin of appreciation it recognises States should have on
deciding what to do to comply with the ECHR. However, if the Court, having
given a State the opportunity to take the necessary measures to amend the
situation and provide reparation, considers that the State has failed to so, it
will, in the majority of cases, step in and adopt a pilot judgment, as happened
365 ECtHR,Woś v. Poland, Judgment on Admissibility of 1March 2005, Application No. 22860/
02, para. 51.
366 Ibid., para. 80.
367 Ibid., para. 84.
368 ECtHR, Woś v. Poland, Judgment of 8 June 2006, Application No. 22860/02, paras 92–112.
369 Ibid., 116.
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in Atanasiu v. Romania, and/or decide to provide just satisfaction under
Article 41 ECHR. So, the Court is ready to use less deference, but this appears
to be an exceptional decision, as illustrated, for example, by the eviction cases
in Turkey, where the Court had the opportunity, and reasons, to give less
deference to Turkey but refrained from doing so, closing the door to 1,500
applications of the same nature.
It is to be noted that even if the Court decides to defer to the State the
question of how best to comply with the Convention, the Court, in certain
situations, considers that the harm caused to applicants has been so strong
that, at the very least, it orders non-pecuniary damages in addition to any other
form of redress that might be applicable at the domestic level, as illustrated by
cases such as Kurić and Others v. Slovenia.
Finally,Wolkenberg and Others v. Poland is the case that stands out in terms
of legal argumentation. In this case, the Court had to consider whether the
20 per cent of the current value of the property as the ceiling, established in
Poland to provide compensation for Bug River claims, was legal. The Court
indicated that the right to property admits legitimate limitations when the
public interest is at stake; it is not an absolute right. Also, the Court noted that
Poland had to provide reparation for a harm it did not cause. As
a consequence, it would create an undue burden for Poland if it was expected
to provide a high amount of compensation when it was not to blame for the
situation.370 More of this type of reasoning is essential to provide victims and
applicants before the Court with legal certainty as to why certain views are
upheld by it and why the consequence of such views is, or is not, to enhance
subsidiarity. Furthermore, more legal grounding is essential to understand
how the ECtHR recognises the scope and reach of the right to reparation for
such violations under the ECHR.
V. WHAT SHOULD REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS
DO WHEN FACED WITH CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC
REPARATION PROGRAMMES?
It has been argued that the right to reparation for victims of armed conflict has
a strong hold in international human rights law. Nevertheless, the scope and
reach of this right remains to be fully defined. This is an area in which the
jurisprudence of supranational bodies such as the IACtHR and the ECtHR
could make a significant contribution. However, as noted, these bodies’
deference to States means that an important opportunity has been missed to
370 ECtHR, Wolkenberg (n. 298), paras 60–4.
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interpret the right to reparation. Deference also means that States are those
framing how they understand the reach and scope of this right when domestic
reparation programmes are at stake.
This part of the chapter argues that the regional Courts should follow a two-
pronged approach to the examination of domestic reparation programmes to
decide whether subsidiarity is a legitimate and legally viable way of fulfilling
the right to reparation of victims – one that is coherent and consistent with
international law: the ‘international law test’ and the ‘public policy test’.
A. The International Law Test
The IACtHR and the ECtHR need to consider whether, in light of inter-
national law and their constitutive treaties (the ACHR and the ECHR),
specific domestic reparation programmes are in accordance with States’
international obligations on reparation. This test is surprisingly absent in the
reasoning of these Courts in the various judgments referred to in this chapter.
The international law test implies the need to address one of the difficult
questions surrounding discussions about the right to reparation for victims of
mass atrocities: whether international human rights law standards on repar-
ation are also applicable to domestic reparation programmes in times of
transition. If they are not, then these courts should establish which standards
should govern, providing strong reasoning why others do not apply. For
example, a court would need to deal with the question of legitimate limita-
tions to the right to reparation in light of general welfare or public interest
reasons. The tribunal should then apply such standards to domestic reparation
programmes and decide whether such mechanisms pass the international
legal test.
There are two relevant international human rights standards at stake: one
crafted by the Inter-American Court following international law (restitutio in
integrum), according to which ‘reparation should be adequate’371 (reparación
integral) to redress the harm caused to the victim; the other included in the
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
Humanitarian Law, according to which reparation should be adequate,
prompt, and effective for harm suffered.372 While the meaning and reach of
371 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodrı́guez (n. 29), para. 25; IACtHR, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 12 August 2008, Series C No. 186,
para. 217.
372 Basic Principles (n. 255), Principle VII(b).
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these concepts is yet to be established, key elements of this principle are that
‘reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm
suffered’, and that reparation should be ‘full and effective’.373
The tension between these standards and domestic reparation programmes
is more than apparent. Domestic reparation programmes pose a problem since
they do not provide reparation to victims according to the harm each victim
has suffered, but rather put victims who suffered similar violations (not
necessarily similar harm) in the same situation, usually by giving them the
same form(s) of reparation. Domestic reparation programmes might also be
limited to compensation as a form of reparation, as seen in various cases that
have reached the ECtHR in relation to large-scale violations, or might include
other forms of reparation, as in the Americas region. They might prioritise
some victims over others or limit eligibility to certain violations that happened
during a specific period of time.374
The relatively recent jurisprudence of the IACtHR appears to suggest
that extraordinary situations, such as those in which serious violations take
place, be it in a dictatorship or in a conflict, call for extraordinary meas-
ures, and therefore that it is not possible to uphold the same international
human rights standards when it comes to reparation. The Court seems to
espouse such a belief particularly in relation to victims of armed conflict in
post-conflict situations. In the words of Judge Garcı́a-Sayán, in
a concurring opinion in Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El
Salvador:
[T]he component of reparation has its own difficulties – and even impossi-
bilities – in the case of massive and widespread violations of human rights. In
these situations, it would seem that the objectives of these massive programs
of reparations is not so much to reinstate the victims to the status quo ante,
but rather to provide clear signals that the rights and dignity of people will be
fully respected.375
The full Court appears to have supported this position in Génesis376 and
Yarce,377 yet it does not resolve the legal question of how to reconcile inter-
national law with the rules applied by domestic reparation programmes.
373 Ibid., Principles IX.15 and IX.18.
374 See Correa, ‘Operationalising the Right of Victims’, Chapter 2 in this volume, section II.
375 Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego Garcia-Sayán in IACtHR, El Mozote (n. 36), para. 33.
This concurring opinion was endorsed by four other judges, meaning that five out of seven
judges sitting at the Court upheld these views.
376 IACtHR, Génesis (n. 106), paras 469–76.
377 IACtHR, Yarce (n. 158), para. 326.
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Even if the IACtHR recognises the difficult context under which a domestic
reparation programme is established, particularly during or after conflict
situations, it should not be sufficient for the State to argue the existence of
difficulties; rather, the State should provide evidence to the Court in that
regard so that the Court could arrive at the conclusion that it might be in the
public interest to limit the right to reparation.
The ECtHR, as well as the IACtHR, considers domestic reparation pro-
grammes to be capable of being adequate and effective remedies under their
respective Conventions. The IACtHR has provided some general criteria as to
what needs to be present if such domestic reparation programmes are to be in
accordance with the Convention, such as adoption in good faith, inclusion of
victims’ consultation and participation, and the proportionality of compensa-
tion. Yet the Court has failed to explain what each criterion means.
Nor has the ECtHR provided sufficient reasoning to explain what these
mean in such situations. In the cases against Turkey on evictions or in
Broniowski and those that followed it, the Court simply limited itself to
addressing, in very general terms, the objections presented by the applicants;
it did not engage in a careful analysis of the remedies.
Legitimate limitations to the right to reparation of victims of armed conflict
is one of the areas on which these Courts needs to elaborate further in the
coming years. The ECtHR has important jurisprudence on legitimate restric-
tions to rights for the public interest, but not in relation to domestic reparation
programmes. Likewise, the IACtHR has not used Article 32(2) of the ACHR to
justify possible limitations. The provision states that ‘[t]he rights of each
person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the
just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society’; despite its
relevance, the Court has barely referred to it.378
According to the Court, Article 32(2) ACHR ‘contains a general statement
that is designed for those cases in particular in which the Convention, in
proclaiming a right, makes no special reference to possible legitimate
restrictions’,379 adding that ‘restrictions on the exercise of certain rights and
freedoms can be justified on the ground that they assure public order’.380
Equally, the Court is mindful of possible abuse of Article 32(2) and establishes
a limitation by stating that ‘public order’ or ‘general welfare’ may, under no
378 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, CompulsoryMembership in an Association Prescribed
by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Requested by the Government of Costa Rica,
13 November 1985, paras 63–7.
379 Ibid., para. 65.
380 Ibid.
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circumstances, be invoked as a means of denying a right guaranteed by the
Convention, or to impair or deprive it of its true content.381
In this regard – and this is a job for both the IACtHR and the ECtHR – it
might be useful to approach the right to reparation as a right with minimum
core obligations that must always be respected and fulfilled, even if the State is
dealing with reparation in a post-conflict setting and even if some limitation
might be legitimate. Here, the views of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights on core obligations resonate:
The Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights
is incumbent, upon every State party. . . . If the Covenant were to be read in
such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be
largely deprived of its raison d’être.382
While the objective of this chapter is not to define the minimum core
obligations of the right to reparation, there are some obligations that arguably
have such status. For instance, when reparation for gross human rights viola-
tions is at stake, domestic reparation programmes have the obligation to
include all forms of reparations and not only compensation or restitution.
This is not the same as saying that each form of reparation should be propor-
tional to the extent of the damage. Proportionality, in a post-conflict context,
should be the result of providing various forms of reparation to victims of gross
and/or large-scale human rights violations, which, when combined, constitute
the best reparation effort the State could give victims without undermining the
essence of the right. This is what Pablo de Greiff has called the ‘completeness’
of a reparation programme.383
There are forms of reparation that are essential to put victims in a position to
uphold their rights, such as rehabilitation. If victims do not have, at the very
least, the necessary physical and mental health, no other reparation measure
would be useful to them and, in most cases, they will be unable to avail
themselves of other remedies to claim their entitlements.384Thus the complete-
ness of a domestic reparation programme is not sufficient; particular attention
must also be given by the Court to how domestic reparation programmes
provide rehabilitation to victims.
381 Ibid., para. 67.
382 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990): The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, E/1991/
231:1, para. 10.
383 Pablo fe Greiff, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes
(New York/Geneva: UN, 2008), 22.
384 Basic Principles (n. 255), Principle IX.21.
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Once the minimum core obligations of the right to reparation are estab-
lished, the regional human rights courts should consider whether they are
fulfilled by the domestic reparation programme at stake. It is not sufficient for
the State to argue the effectiveness and adequacy of the domestic reparation
programme in general terms; the State should also explain why the victims in
the case at stake have not benefited from the domestic reparation programme,
or if they have, how and when, so that the Court can fully assess that
information.
If those minimum core obligations are fulfilled by the domestic reparation
programme and if there is evidence that even though they have not been
fulfilled in the specific case at stake, they will be in a prompt manner, the
ECtHR and the IACtHR could decide not to order new reparations and could
defer reparation to the domestic reparation programme. Such a decision could
be conditional on the State complying with minimum core obligations within
a set period of time, at the end of which the Court may still be able to order
reparations to the victims if the State has not done so.
If the violations over which the regional human rights courts have jurisdic-
tion are not incorporated within the domestic reparation programme, then the
courts, despite the ‘completeness’ of the domestic reparation programme,
should order reparation for the harms that have ensued.
The standard of prompt reparation also faces enormous challenges in the
jurisprudence of both courts. Most of the violations where domestic reparation
programmes are at stake happened decades ago and the human rights courts
have to deal with them many years later. In this context, the question of
subsidiarity also becomes relevant. How long should victims wait before
regional human rights courts decide on reparation? Is it reasonable for
a victim to be told, after so many years waiting for justice, that they need to
go back to their domestic systems and use domestic reparation programmes to
obtain reparation? When these questions are asked, the promptness of remed-
ies appears to be at odds with subsidiarity. Furthermore, the courts are dealing
with some of themost vulnerable victims of human rights violations who are in
urgent need of attention.
B. The Public Policy Test
This takes the discussion to the consideration of the public policy reasons –
general welfare reasons or public interest reasons – that the State took into
account when designing and implementing a domestic reparation programme
that, prima facie, is in conflict with international human rights law. Such a test
would include, but not be limited to, gaining a better understanding of the
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political, cultural, and economic reasons taken into account when setting up
the programme.
Arguments frequently raised by States before the regional human rights
courts include the lack of financial means to provide reparation in other
ways, as in the case of Colombia or Guatemala, or the difficulties of
providing compensation given the many claims for restitution and compen-
sation as a result of the transition from a totalitarian regime, as in the case
of Poland. Any such claim needs to be substantiated with evidence –
something that was missing in the pleadings of all of these States. The
IACtHR and the ECtHR should request from each State reliable informa-
tion about the grounds considered to justify the measures adopted under
the domestic reparation programme. States can indeed argue general wel-
fare or public interest issues, but they need to substantiate them and the two
Courts need to consider whether those measures balance, in an adequate
manner, the interests and the right to reparation of the victims at stake. The
ECtHR, depending on the provision at stake, engages in this type of
analysis. It has done so particularly with the right to property under
Article 1 of Protocol 1, as in the case of Broniowski v. Poland,385 but it has
not done so in relation to domestic reparation programmes, such as the
Turkish one.
Given that the human rights courts decide cases far away from where the
violations took or are taking place, and form their views based on the facts and
the law by means of the litigation of cases and previous cases, other mechan-
isms are necessary to provide these bodies with the information required to
adequately assess domestic reparation programmes. In the case of the
IACtHR, it could request evidence, at its own motion, from anyone the
Court considers relevant;386 it could also send some members of the Court
to the country in question to obtain more information of the domestic repar-
ation programme;387 and it could obtain affidavits from experts on domestic
reparation programmes and related issues, answering particular questions
about the suitability and effectiveness of the measures established
domestically.
385 ECtHR, Broniowski (n. 237), paras 182–7.
386 Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
387 An on-site visit by the Court to Guatemala took place in March 2017, to monitor compliance
with some reparationmeasures in the judgments in Rio Negro and Plan de Sanchez. This was
the first on-site visit of its kind in which the Court was able to learn more about Guatemala’s
domestic reparation programme through the lenses of two cases it had decided against this
country.
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It is not suggested here that the regional courts should decide how States
must allocate their resources. The courts must, however, consider whether the
States’ expenditure is reasonable in relation to the harms the programmes
intend to redress.
In the case of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the representa-
tives of the victims, particularly the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights, should make use of the procedural opportunity to controvert what the
State is saying. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights is particu-
larly well placed to comment on this, given that one of its functions is to
monitor the human rights situation in all members of the Organization of
American States (OAS).388 Thus it has important structural information that it
should present to the Court. Indeed, important thematic hearings have taken
place before the Commission on various domestic reparation programmes at
which information has been provided about their achievements and chal-
lenges, such as in relation to Peru or Guatemala. The Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights has presented expert affidavits on domestic
reparation programmes to the Court. For example, Cristián Correa, one of the
contributors to this volume, presented one in Chichupac.389 Amicus should
also be presented before the Court both before a case is decided and
during the process of monitoring compliance with orders given by the Court
in the judgment.
In the case of the ECtHR, various tools are at its disposal to assess the
political, cultural, and economic policy choices behind domestic repar-
ation programmes. The burden should be on the State to explain why it has
adequate and effective mechanisms to redress the violation(s) and to
explain why it faces legitimate public interest issues. The Court, based on
Article 36 ECHR, could permit third-party interventions, allowing another
Council of Europe Member State to participate if one of the applicants is its
national. Equally, any individual or a non-governmental organisation
(NGO) could act as a third-party intervener, as was the case of REDRESS
in 2014 in Cyprus v. Turkey. The Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights could also intervene, as of right, according to Article 36.
Finally, the Committee of Ministers responsible for monitoring the execu-
tion of judgments handed down by the Court has valuable information in
relation to each State and particular violations – information that could be
important for the Court.
388 OAS General Assembly, Resolution 447 1979, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Art. 18.
389 IACtHR, Aldea Chichupac (n. 146), para. 8.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has established that subsidiarity remains a shaping principle of
international law and international relations. It has also illustrated the impact
of this principle on reparation. It has shown that the two major regional
human rights courts have dealt with subsidiarity differently, probably as
a result of their mandates, institutional set-up, history of human rights viola-
tions, and the contexts in which they have to adjudicate. In this regard, a shift
has been noted on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. It has moved from being
a Court that would not exercise subsidiarity on reparation for victims of mass
atrocities to one that is open to the engagement. This engagement appears to
be triggered by the changing landscape of human rights violations in the
region, the arrival of more cases to the Court, the year-on-year increase of
cases before the Court for monitoring compliance, and the deceiving signs
that Inter-American law has penetrated States’ environment and culture,
including on reparation.
The concept of subsidiarity is embedded in the ECtHR’s work and, as
Madsen shows, it is getting stronger. While the Court has taken important
steps towards ordering reparation beyond compensation and is engaging
more with general measures, this practice, as noticed in this chapter and
supported by the work of Donald and Speck, remains small if compared to
the overall case law of the Court. Lack of adequate, prompt, and effective
reparation for victims of armed conflict in Europe will only bring many
more cases before the Court. The ECtHR, mindful of this risk for the
Convention system, has tried to use pilot and quasi-pilot judgments to
trigger State behaviour. It believes that subsidiarity should be the solution
to the problem. However, it is to be noted that the Court also acknowledges
the failure of States to act when given the opportunity to do so and, in
relation to these cases, the Court has stepped in to order reparation at least
in the form of compensation under Article 41 ECHR. This also means that
the Court is exceptionally ready to revisit subsidiarity for the sake of the
Convention system.
That subsidiarity should be a key regulating principle of international law
appears to be not only based on the belief that States know best how to deal
with the problems they face, but also supported by the idea that States are
more likely to fulfil the right of victims to reparation. This latter idea has
gained currency in the practice of regional human rights courts. Nevertheless,
the evidence in this chapter refutes this claim. More deference to countries
emerging from or dealing with conflict, such as Colombia, Guatemala,
Turkey, or Russia, has not yielded better implementation. On the contrary,
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it has caused more harm to victims who have been unable to enjoy their right
to reparation.
Guatemala is a paradigmatic case and one in which the Inter-American
Court has attempted, by different legal and diplomatic means, to secure
compliance with its orders. Nevertheless, its work has not produced the
desired results. Of the thirty-four cases decided by the Court up until
November 2019, all butMaldonado Ordoñez,390 a case not related to violations
that occurred during the armed conflict, remain pending full compliance.391
The situation is not that different when Russia or Turkey are considered. As
explained earlier, they remain problematic cases from an implementation
perspective in Europe. The Committee of Ministers is currently examining
the execution of Aslakhanova andOthers v. Russia as part of theKhashiyev and
Akayeva litigation – a group of 251 similar cases, the oldest of which was
decided in 2005.392 All of these cases are pending compliance. During
a recent examination of this group of cases, the Committee deplored the
lack of progress in the search for the disappeared.393 What these 251 cases
show is the size of the challenge faced both by the ECtHR and the Committee
of Ministers to ensure compliance with their judgments and with the obliga-
tions deriving from the ECHR.
A key problem in ensuring the implementation of reparation orders (be they
international or domestic) is the political will of those in power to implement
them. In post-conflict situations in which State institutions tend to be very
weak or do not exist, and in which democracy and the rule of law are not in
place, complying with reparation orders depends on the will of particular
individuals rather than institutions and on the politics of the moment. The
problem increases depending on the way in which victims are perceived by
those in power. If they are seen as combatants, terrorists, or people who are
abusing the State, they are not likely to get reparation. The situation becomes
even more problematic if root causes of conflict have not been addressed. It is
no coincidence to find that themeasures that tend to be the least implemented
in post-conflict situations are precisely guarantees of non-repetition or general
measures. If those who remain in power are the perpetrators, the incentives for
social change remain slight, and complying with domestic reparation
390 Resolution of the IACtHR, Maldonado Ordoñez v. Guatemala, Resolution Monitoring
Compliance, 30 August 2016.
391 IACtHR, Annual Report 2016, 7.
392 ECtHR, Zara Isayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 6 June 2005, Application No. 57950/00.
393 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 1310th Meeting (13–15March 2018), available at
www.coe.int/en/web/cm/-/1310th-human-rights-meeting-of-the-ministers-deputies-13-15-marc
h-2018-?inheritRedirect=true.
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programmes or international judgments is out of the question.394 This is an
important consideration that regional human rights courts should take into
account when considering subsidiarity and reparation.
The analysis of subsidiarity and reparation at these courts has also shown
that there are issues related to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies that
need to be clarified by the case law of these bodies. Under international
human rights law and under the subsidiarity principle, victims shall exhaust
domestic remedies before going to an international body for adjudication.
Exceptions to the rule exist, such as when remedies are not adequate or
effective at the time of the application before the international body.
However, when victims reach the international bodies and said bodies exercise
jurisdiction and adjudicate on the merits of cases and find violations, the
reasons to relinquish jurisdiction over reparation, while in some cases legal, as
in the case of Article 35 ECHR, could be questioned from a fairness point of
view. Victims of armed conflict are often in a highly vulnerable situation and
have been waiting for reparation for years, which, as a consequence, has
worsened their situation. When they finally reach regional courts, they are
asked to use domestic reparation programmes to obtain reparation despite the
challenging contexts in which reparation for these victims takes place and, on
many occasions, such as shown by the Turkish cases, when those domestic
reparation programmes were not even in place when the cases reached
Strasbourg. In relation to victims of armed conflict, the regional human rights
courts should not relinquish jurisdiction over reparation unless they have been
provided with all of the necessary evidence that domestic reparation pro-
grammes were in place, and were adequate and effective to obtain reparation,
at the time the application was filed, but the victims did not use them.
The interplay between international human rights courts and domestic
reparation programmes has, for the most part, relied on subsidiarity as a way
of relinquishing jurisdiction – the negative concept explained in section II of
394 This is exactly why Shuichi Furuya asks for international bodies to step in:
[I]f this right to choose is admitted, it may become a positive incentive for policy-makers
to establish mechanisms that are more attractive than domestic fora in terms of
procedure, remedies and expeditiousness, which would avoid the responsible parties
being forced to participate in another forum and spreading their limited resources
across parallel proceedings. This would also be beneficial to victims.
[ . . . ]
. . . [I]t is totally unrealistic to expect the victims’ State, or its domestic courts, to settle
reparations.
Furuya, ‘Right to Reparation’, Chapter 1 in this volume, sections VII.C and III.C
(emphasis added).
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this chapter. From this perspective, there is not really coexistence, because the
international bodies are referring back to States the issues connected to
reparation and domestic reparation programmes. As a result, a very important
dimension of subsidiarity – that of complementarity – is somehow lost when
subsidiarity in its negative sense takes priority.
But this chapter has indicated that complementarity must also be read as
positive complementarity, meaning that international and regional courts
have the authority to define the meaning of international obligations and to
foster an environment – a landscape – for compliance with them, including
reparation. These international bodies are not making the best use of this
authority to help to define the scope and reach of the right to reparation for
victims of armed conflict when gross and/or large-scale human rights viola-
tions are at stake. This appears to be particularly the case of the ECtHR. The
IACtHR, probably as a result of its long and significant jurisprudence on
reparation for victims of gross human rights violations, has not fully relin-
quished its authority over reparation, although subsidiarity has gained force in
its jurisprudence. What this chapter has called ‘qualified deference’ consti-
tutes the IACtHR’s embryonic attempt to reconcile subsidiarity in its negative
dimension with the virtues of complementarity.
This chapter concludes that a healthy coexistence between international
and regional human rights courts and domestic reparation programmes would
be one in which these courts provide strong legal reasoning for their views on
reparation for victims in general, but particularly for victims of armed conflict,
helping to flesh out the scope and reach of this right, even in extraordinary
times such as those faced by States during or after armed conflict. The legal
reasoning of these courts might not be shared by everyone. However, if the
argumentation is strong, it will bring legal certainty to the discussion and to the
litigants of a case; it will not generate false expectations for victims and it could
even have a positive impact on the minimalistic approach States take to
reparation for victims of armed conflict, encouraging higher standards. At its
best, it can also encourage greater positive complementarity: a landscape of
domestic and international institutions all working towards ensuring repar-
ation for victims of mass atrocities. Furthermore, careful legal reasoning will
protect the legitimacy and authority of these bodies. It could also help States to
take more seriously their approach to reparation for victims of mass atrocities
because they would know that failure to act in a diligent manner would imply
these bodies exercising jurisdiction.
Key to providing proper legal reasoning in judgments on domestic repar-
ation programmes is the application of the two-pronged test developed in this
chapter: the ‘international law test’ and the ‘public policy test’. As has been
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argued, there are various ways in which the regional human rights courts
could address the legality, adequacy, and effectiveness of domestic reparation
programmes under international law. The key tasks for the future are precisely
to indicate if and how the human right to reparation for such atrocious
violations could be limited in a legal and legitimate way by domestic repar-
ation programmes, as well as which are the core obligations of this right
without which it will lose its meaning. These tasks are crucial in the years to
come or else, through subsidiarity, States will continue to apply different
standards on reparation that respond to the demands of the moment and
which do not always take into account the essence of the right to reparation –
that is, to repair, as far and as promptly as is possible, the harm done to victims.
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